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1Chapter One
The Phenomenon
 “Cambodia was a satellite of imperialism, of U.S. imperialism in particular…the 
poor peasants were the most impoverished, the most oppressed class in 
Cambodian society, and it was this class that was the foundation of the 
Cambodian Party … Revolution or people’s war in any country is the business of 
the masses and should be carried out primarily by their own efforts: there is no 
other way … the Kampuchean Revolution must have [the option of] two forms of 
struggle: peaceful means; and means that are not peaceful.  We will do our 
utmost to grasp firmly peaceful struggle … however, [we] must be ready at all 
times to adopt non-peaceful means of struggle if the imperialists and feudalists … 
stubbornly insist on forcing us to take that road… in the past we held our destiny 
in our own hands, and then we allowed others to resolve it in our place.  We must 
never allow this historical error to be repeated … we must always hold firmly to 
the stance of independence-mastery, rely on our own forces and endure 
difficulties and suffering.”
--Khmer Rouge Leaders Pol Pot and Khieu Samphan1
“Twenty years of UN silence on Khmer Rouge genocide encouraged Cambodians 
to ignore the past.”
--Ben Kiernan, “Coming to Terms with the Past: Cambodia”
“The world, in general, now knows what had happened to Cambodia since April 
17, 1975.  Most notably, the world now knows about the Khmer Rouge reign of 
terrors and the Killing Field that followed.  It was a nightmare that I would 
rather forget completely.  Unfortunately, it was not possible for me to forget this 
tragic past in Cambodia’s history and my own.  I am still hopeful for justice 
because vengeance can be very bitter, I know.” 
--Survivor of the Khmer Rouge2
I.  The Problem
On October 4, 2004, the Cambodian Parliament unanimously voted to ratify the 
Khmer Rouge tribunal to try cases of genocide and crimes against humanity committed 
by the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979.  More than 1.7 million Cambodians died 
from starvation, execution, and disease during that period; however, it is only now, 
1
 Philip Short, Pol Pot: the History of a Nightmare (London: John Murray Publishers, 2004) 57-213.
2
“Survivors’ Stories.”  Documentation Center of Cambodia, 10 Aug. 2005 
<http://www.dccam.org/survivors/survivors_stories.htm>.
2almost three decades after the event, that the Cambodian Government and the 
international community have come to an agreement to bring justice to the Cambodian 
people against the Khmer Rouge.
Although tensions initially arose over the terms of the tribunal between the United 
Nations and the Cambodian Government, it has been established that the tribunal will be 
based on Cambodian law, “with the March Agreement3 stipulating that where there is 
uncertainty regarding Cambodian law, the tribunal may turn to international law.”4  The 
structure of the tribunal will consist of two extraordinary chambers, the Trial Chamber 
and the Supreme Court Chamber, where both chambers will be comprised of a majority 
of Cambodian judges and of a minority of international judges.  Moreover, decisions will 
require a supermajority of judges, where at least one international judge’s vote in any 
majority will be needed for any decision to hold.5  It has also been held that the tribunal 
will aim at prosecuting senior Khmer Rouge leaders and those most responsible for 
committing crimes against humanity and of genocide between April 1975 and January 
1979.6
Susan Cook and Ben Kiernan have interpreted these processes optimistically, 
arguing that “survivors of the genocide will know for the first time that their suffering has 
3
 The March Agreement refers to the draft agreement between the United Nations and Cambodia on the 
status of a court to try the Khmer Rouge. It takes into account both United States proposals on the creation 
of the court, as well as measures proposed by the Cambodian Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.  The law was passed by the Cambodian government on August 10, 
2001, and appropriated jurisdiction to Extraordinary Chambers over human rights offenses, as well as its 
own definition of genocide. See Scott Luftglass, “Crossroads in Cambodia: the United Nation’s 
Responsibility to Withdraw Involvement from the Establishment of a Cambodian Tribunal to Prosecute the 
Khmer Rouge,” Virginia Law Review 90 (2004): 912-913.
4
 Ibid 893-964.
5
 Ibid 917.
6
 Stephen Heder and Brian Tittemore, “Seven Candidates for Prosecution: Accountability for the Crimes of 
the Khmer Rouge.”  War Crimes Research Office, American University, Jun. 2001, 15 Aug. 2005 
<http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/khmerrouge.pdf?rd=1>.
3been acknowledged and taken seriously by the world,”7 and that although “a legal 
accounting of the crimes of the Khmer Rouge era cannot restore to Cambodians their lost 
loved ones, [it] could give them back their history.”8  Some participants in the 2003 Asia 
Society Symposium have concurred, stating that “imperfect justice is better than no 
justice at all.  The Khmer Rouge leaders are getting older and any further delay in 
establishing a tribunal may result in the chief perpetrators not living long enough to be 
held legally responsible.”9
Others, on the other hand, have pointed out a corrupt judicial system that might 
impede an effective transitional justice for Cambodians.  Scott Luftglass states to this 
effect that the United Nations should withdraw from any involvement in the adjudication 
of the Khmer Rouge crimes, because to fail to do so “would compromise the best 
interests of the international community, the development and enforcement of 
international law, and the stability and rehabilitation of Cambodia.”10 The danger for 
Cambodia, many also say, is that of bringing out old wounds among the victims and their 
families without having a clear idea of how the Khmer Rouge tribunal will enable these 
individuals to heal and move forward, as well as enable Cambodia, as a country, to deal 
with its past of mass atrocities without disintegrating its social, judicial, economic, and 
political orders.  For Cambodia, the lack of exploration of other transitional justice 
approaches, such as truth and reconciliation commissions and public hearings, or of using 
lessons learned from comparative transitional justice procedures in countries like South 
Africa, Rwanda, East Timor, and Sierra Leone, also entails significant drawbacks for 
7
 Susan Cook, “Prosecuting Genocide in Cambodia: the Winding Path Towards Justice.”  Magazine: the 
Tribunals, May 2001, 5 Aug. 2005 <http://www.crimesofwar.org/tribun-mag/mag_cambodia.html>.
8
 Ben Kiernan, “Coming to Terms with the Past: Cambodia,” History Today 54.9 (2004): 16. 
9
 Kelli Muddell, “Transitional Justice in Cambodia: Challenges and Opportunities.”  Symposium Report, 
Asia Society, 9 Sept. 2003, 5 Aug. 2005 <http:www.asiasource.org/asip/Cambodia_report.pdf>.
10
 Luftglass (2004): 896.
4effective transitional justice to take place for the millions of Cambodians affected.  Craig 
Etcheson warns against the tribunal for only extending to the very top leaders of the 
Khmer Rouge and has stressed the importance of looking at other techniques of 
reconciliation and justice to take into account that “all across the country, Cambodians 
live side-by-side with local Khmer Rouge leaders who were responsible for the execution 
of their loved ones during the Khmer Rouge regime.”11
Although current literature on Cambodia and transitional justice has criticized or 
praised the proceedings of the tribunal with regard to reconciliation, corruption, judicial 
effectiveness, and international standards of justice, I find missing an examination of how 
current processes that aim to create the Khmer Rouge tribunal have become political 
grounds for Hun Sen’s Administration to assert its views of sovereignty, democracy, 
transitional justice, and self-sufficiency, and for the United Nations to regain its 
reputation as a guarantor of human rights in the context of Cambodia.  For Hun Sen and 
his Government, the tribunal has been seen as an opportunity to assert Cambodia’s status 
in the world order as an independent, sovereign country, whereas for the United Nations, 
the tribunal has been a means to bring about the justice it failed to give Cambodians post-
1979.
In addition, what is less clear within current research of transitional justice in 
Cambodia is examination that is inclusive of the different factors that created conditions 
for the Khmer Rouge to gain power in 1975 and that continue to play a role today as the 
Cambodian government and international community are working together to find justice 
for Cambodia.  Mainly, as I will show, these factors are the political disagreements over 
formation and identity in post-colonial Cambodia, the role of foreign influences in 
11
 Craig Etcheson, “Faith Traditions and Reconciliation in Cambodia,” Harvard University, “Settling 
Accounts?  Truth, Justice, and Redress in Post-conflict Societies” Conference, 1-3 Nov. 2004: 40.
5domestic politics and social life, the struggle for Cambodia to find its place in the global 
world order as a developing country, and the nature of public support for democracy.  
Whereas historical and biographical accounts have been written by Elizabeth Becker, 
Philip Short, Ben Kiernan, and David Chandler to describe Cambodia during 
colonization, post-colonization, and after the Khmer Rouge rule, current literature does 
not provide an understanding of how these dilemmas and factors have shaped Cambodia 
during those periods and continue to affect Cambodia in 2005.  As a result, the absence of 
such analyses might weaken the pursuit of transitional justice.
Moreover, I contend that current literature, with the exception of Craig Etcheson’s 
essay entitled “Faith Traditions and Reconciliation in Cambodia,” has failed to 
contextualize the issue of transitional justice around its most important audience: the 
victims.  Although Etcheson has proposed a model in which reconciliation can be 
achieved through the leadership of Buddhist monks and other culturally accepted rituals, 
he does not address specifically how this model could be applied in conjunction with 
other transitional justice mechanisms, mainly tribunals and truth commissions.  As a 
result, the lack of victim-centralized approach to transitional justice may not have the 
intended consequences of uncovering the truth about the past, reaching reconciliation 
between victims and perpetrators, and achieving healing.   
In addition, what remains absent is the comparative observation of other 
transitional justice procedures that have taken place in South Africa, Rwanda, East 
Timor, and Sierra Leone, which may be important for Cambodia.  As David Crocker 
asserts, “more generally, few empirical studies compare the effects in different countries 
of the various types and forms of tools—including amnesties, truth commissions, 
6museums, and trials—for reckoning with past wrongs.” 12  As a result, I view it as 
important to use lessons from similar situations of countries trying to deal with their past 
of mass human rights violations in order to ensure justice, reconciliation, and healing.
I am of the opinion, therefore, that the issue of transitional justice for Cambodia 
has become politicized grounds for the Cambodian Government and the United Nations 
to assert their reputation and image in the world order.
II.  Significance of Research
The writing of this thesis is driven by two pursuits: one personal and one 
intellectual.  As the daughter of Cambodian refugees, I engage in this thesis with the 
personal intent of finding out a part of my roots and history that has often been left out of 
stories told to me by my parents and other Cambodian folks.  Indeed, I seek to find out 
the historical and social factors that contributed to the genocide of over 1.7 million 
Cambodians and to ensure that the “sickness” that existed within Cambodian society then
never gets repeated again.  Additionally, this thesis is driven by my personal motivations 
for social justice and outrage at the persistent impunity pervading in Cambodia regarding
the Khmer Rouge.  In effect, the current trend of the tribunal processes having become 
political grounds for both the Hun Sen Government and the United Nations provide the 
urgency for the writing of this thesis.
Intellectually, I see this thesis as a culmination of my intellectual growth, where I 
see the opportunity of putting into application the many qualitative, quantitative, 
analytical, and research-skills that I have acquired in my four years of study.  Moreover, 
the research of this thesis gives me the chance to intellectually engage in a topic that has 
been close to my heart for over twenty years and to be able to suggest specific policy 
12
 David Crocker, “Punishment, Reconciliation, and Democratic Deliberation,” Buffalo Criminal Law 
Review 5 (2002): 533.
7recommendations to the Cambodian Government and the United Nations as to what the 
direction of transitional justice should look like.  As I show in the next chapters, this 
project also entails the revisiting of and interrogations of my own personal beliefs 
regarding justice, human rights, truth, history, and democracy.  In effect, as I have 
engaged with the subjects of transitional justice, acknowledgment, truth, history, and 
democracy, I have realized that justice is not a fixed notion based on the rule of law but 
instead one that is subject to particular circumstances, societal needs, and empowerment.  
III.  Research Question and Modes of Inquiry
This project sets out to cautiously examine and assess the processes of transitional 
justice that have been taking place in Cambodia, especially as they purport to the creation 
of a Khmer Rouge tribunal.  Somewhat more specifically, this study will address the 
following overarching question: how can mechanisms of transitional justice best be 
implemented to enable Cambodia’s survivors to find justice and healing?  I want to 
make clear, however, that this project is not about laying out a complete solution to 
Cambodia’s dilemma of transitional justice.  Rather, this study aims at pointing out the 
issues that need to be dealt with in order to enhance the potentials of effective transitional 
justice taking place for the country and its people.
To address the main question, I must look at other supplementary issues, which 
include: 1) why is transitional justice necessary for Cambodia; 2) who should decide and 
how are the voices of the victims and survivors to be included, if at all; and 3) how 
should Cambodia deal with its evil past while ensuring that its society does not 
disintegrate politically, socially, and economically?
IV.  Research Methodology and Sources
8Methodologically, this study employs a combination of normative and 
explanatory approaches, such as historical narrative, process tracing, and case studies.  
Moreover, I approach this project from a Foucaultian understanding of knowledge as an 
area prone for interpretation and questioning in order to reach a higher truth.  As he 
writes, “to know must therefore be to interpret: to find a way from the visible mark to that 
which is being said by it and which, without that mark, would lie like unspoken speech, 
dormant within things.”13  In the footsteps of Foucault, I am of the opinion that 
interpretation is informed by actual experiences, and that the contextualization of these 
experiences is important in order to bring to the surface new information and new 
knowledge unique to specific societies.  Foucault asserts that knowledge is built upon “a 
historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to 
recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying.”14  In the context 
of Cambodia and transitional justice, therefore, the framework of my research is informed 
in one part by this understanding that knowledge must be informed, questioned, and 
revisited in order to make sense of the society that we are investigating.  Rather than 
proceed with this project by describing solely the limited situation of transitional justice 
in Cambodia, I seek to evaluate and analyze transitional justice by contextualizing it in 
the larger framework of historical and socio-political processes in Cambodia.
In light of this understanding of knowledge, this study is also inspired by critical 
theory.  Brian Fay defines critical theory as explaining “a social order in such a way that 
it becomes itself the catalyst which leads to the transformation of the social order… it is a 
13
 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: an Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1970) 32.
14
 See Paul Rainbow, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (New York: The New Press, 1994) 315.
9critique of [the society itself that aims at provoking] a change in the [society’s] 
consciousness and subsequently to the transformation of [the] society itself.”15
In order to achieve the purposes of this project, which is that of seeking a more 
victim-centralized approach to transitional justice in Cambodia, I complement my critical 
theory approach with a comparative analysis of case studies in transitional justice 
mechanisms.  Whereas Janet Schofield refers to this comparative process as 
“comparability,” other scholars, such as E.G. Guba and Y.S. Lincoln, have named it 
“fittingness”; however, both concepts refer to a similar approach.  Schofield explains 
comparability as “the degree to which components of a study—including the units of 
analysis, concepts generated, population characteristics, and settings—are sufficiently 
well described and defined that other researchers can use the results of the study as a 
basis for comparison.”16  Concurrently, Guba and Lincoln define fittingness through “its 
emphasis on analyzing the degree to which the situation studied matches other situations 
in which one is interested, [and] provides a more realistic and workable way of thinking 
about the generalizability of research results than do more classical approaches.”17  In this 
project, then, I look at comparative case examples of transitional justice in South Africa, 
Rwanda, East Timor, and Sierra Leone, in order to derive lessons from these experiences 
and inform the victim-centralized model that I propose for Cambodia.
Along with the approaches of critical theory and comparative analysis, I interpret 
my role as a researcher in terms of Rodolfo Stavenhagen’s explanation that the role of the 
social scientist researcher has ceased to be one isolated in academic fixture and 
contribution.  To this effect, he contends that social scientific knowledge has become an 
15
 Brian Fay, “The Elements of Critical Social Science,” Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice, 
ed. Martyn Hammersley (London: Sage Publications Limited, 1993) 33.
16
 Janet Schofield, “Increasing the Generalizability of Qualitative Research,” Social Research: Philosophy, 
Politics and Practice, ed. Martyn Hammersley (London: Sage Publications Limited, 1993) 207.
17
 Ibid 206. 
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element of power, economically, socially, and politically.  As a result, the social scientist 
has three options:  
[First], he can simply continue producing information—like an assembly line 
worker produces spare parts—without regard to its ultimate use … or [second], he 
can produce knowledge suited to prevailing and established interpretations of 
society, accepting and using in his work the premises upon which are predicated 
the continuity and stability of existing social systems … [or] third, he can attempt 
to offer alternative explanations; explore new theoretical avenues; and exercise 
his intellectual critique of established or accepted ‘truths.’18
As should be obvious by now, the option that this project follows is that of option three, 
where as a researcher, I understand the significance of my work in evaluating and 
assessing current practices of transitional justice in Cambodia in order to arrive at a 
model that can better encompass the goals of justice for the Cambodian people.
In addition, I want to bring up a final element that David Crocker calls the insider-
outsider hybrid.  This term refers to the role of the researcher as an agent who provides 
alternative explanations and new theoretical approaches to a particular social dilemma, 
while maintaining an understanding of the social contexts that surround the particular 
society that he is investigating.  As Crocker writes, the insider-outsider hybrid is the 
combination of insider’s and outsider’s advantages, where the researcher can “immerse 
himself in [a given group], grasp some of what is going on, and be accepted as a dialogue 
partner, [while] at the same time [retaining] and [taking] advantage of his outsider status 
in order to reflect an ‘alien’ culture back to its insiders … bring new ideas … and speak 
the truth.”19  With regards to this research, therefore, I follow an approach similar to this 
insider-outsider hybrid, as I am myself an individual connected to the larger Cambodian 
18
 Rodolfo Stavenhagen, “Decolonizing Applied Social Sciences,” Social Research: Philosophy, Politics 
and Practice, ed. Martyn Hammersley (London: Sage Publications Limited, 1993) 60-61.
19
 David Crocker, “Cross-Cultural Criticism and Development Ethics,” Philosophy and Public Policy 
Quarterly 24.3 (2004): 6.
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community, yet also a scholar who will attempt to shed light on the situation of 
transitional justice in Cambodia.   
To assist me in this study, I draw on secondary sources as well as a few primary 
sources that have been written on Cambodia and on the issue of transitional justice.  The 
secondary sources consist of historical analyses, newspaper articles on transitional 
justice, country studies, biographies, conference papers, and comparative case studies.  In 
addition, the primary sources constitute of interviews conducted with Cambodian 
survivors of the Khmer Rouge era, as well as with individuals, such as academics and 
civil society members, that have participated in the current proceedings of transitional 
justice in Cambodia.
Overall, I find my use of primary and secondary sources to be realistic, given the 
length of time allowed to complete this project and the breadth of recent research that has 
been completed on Cambodia by other scholars.  Although it was originally my intent to 
conduct field research in Cambodia as it pertains to transitional justice and discuss the 
processes with survivors, it became clear that such comprehensive work would not be 
able to take place, given the limited resources at my disposition.  Other limitations 
involved in this study include the lack of elaborate information on comparative case 
examples of transitional justice.  In many instances, only partial information was 
available from newspaper articles, articles in academic journals, and the Internet, which 
made it difficult to draw elaborate comparisons and apply them to the situation of 
Cambodia.  Despite these limitations, however, I feel that this study has the promise to 
provide information and a model for transitional in Cambodia.
V.  Organization
12
This project is significant for a number of practical and humanistic reasons, which 
include 1) the need for Cambodians, both in Cambodia and abroad, to understand and 
find justice for the events that took place during the Khmer Rouge era; 2) issues of 
accountability; 3) the larger issue of respect for human rights; and 4) the possible effects 
that effective and successful transitional justice in Cambodia can have on other societies 
with pasts of mass atrocities that have yet to be dealt with.  Targeted to the public policy 
world, this study aims at providing assessments and recommendations as to what 
measures of transitional justice are and are not working for Cambodia, and what should 
be implemented. 
To accomplish these tasks, this study is constituted of four additional chapters.  
Chapter two reviews the relevant literature surrounding the commanding concepts of this 
research: post-colonization, genocide, transitional justice, and emerging democracy. First, 
post- needs to be analyzed in order to understand how the Khmer Rouge gained power in 
Cambodia between 1975 and 1979.  Hence, emphasis will be placed on the political, 
historical, and social contexts of post-colonization and the era of the Vietnam War.  
Second, ‘genocide’ is another concept that I examine because of the legal and political 
implications that surround the term, and how the definition of ‘genocide’ complicates the 
situation of transitional justice for Cambodia’s survivors.  Third, I look at transitional 
justice, its definition, and the different mechanisms by which such justice can be 
achieved for societies dealing with their pasts of mass atrocities.  Finally, I analyze the 
issue of society and emerging democracy as it pertains to the challenges and reasons for 
why societies with histories of gross human rights violations find democracy to be an 
important means by which to rebuild public support and national sentiments for the 
country.
13
Chapter three consists of a contextualized background overview of Cambodia, 
where I examine the historical, social, and political events that have shaped Cambodia 
into the country that it is today.  Rather than start off with the premise that the Khmer 
Rouge are guilty of human rights violations, I briefly examine instead the factors, such as 
Cambodia’s invasion by its neighboring countries, colonization by the French, forced 
involvement during the Vietnam War, corruption, poverty, and political instability that 
contributed to the rise of the Khmer Rouge.  In doing so, this chapter provides a compact 
analysis of the Khmer Rouge, their ideology, and their paranoia that ultimately led to the 
destruction of Cambodia and its people.  In this section, I also recognize the importance 
of understanding the Khmer Rouge, their aspirations and policies, and their reasons for 
undertaking the path they did.  Without such an approach, I would be guilty of bias and 
predisposed position that would undermine the credibility of this study.  I follow by 
looking at the post-Khmer Rouge era and the lack of transitional justice processes that 
took place under the Cambodian Government or the international community.  I 
demonstrate how leaders, both domestically and internationally, were more interested in 
finding political stability and reconciliation rather than addressing the violations of 
human rights that had occurred within Cambodia.  Finally, I finish by explaining the 
processes of transitional justice that have taken place since 1997 with regards to setting 
up a Khmer Rouge tribunal.
Chapter four delves into the issue of transitional justice by first applying the 
definition of transitional justice that I provided in chapter two to the current tribunal 
proceedings taking place in Cambodia.  In doing so, I evaluate the proceedings against 
the issues of truth, dignity, memory, history, and recovery that are inherent within 
transitional justice, and I demonstrate why a more victim-centralized approach is needed.  
14
From this analysis, I then move to looking at comparative case studies, such as Rwanda, 
South Africa, East Timor, and Sierra Leone, in order to draw lessons from these case 
examples as to what worked in ensuring transitional justice for the victims and within 
what contexts.  I then provide a victim-centralized model that can be adopted for 
Cambodia in order to ensure that the purposes of transitional justice are indeed achieved.  
In doing so, I propose the elements of public deliberation, alternative mechanisms that 
incorporate cultural and religious practices, truth commissions, and nationwide 
discussions as other means by which the tribunal can be enhanced in order to ensure that 
justice is found for Cambodia’s survivors.
Finally, chapter five, the conclusion, provides a few policy recommendations for 
the Cambodian Government and the United Nations as to how and why both entities 
should adopt the victim-centralized model that I propose.  Although I highlight the 
political, social, and economic challenges and limitations that the Cambodian 
Government and the United Nations might face in the implementation of these 
recommendations, I point out the benefits that both parties can receive from ensuring that 
the goals of transitional justice are realized.  I end by suggesting avenues for further 
research.
15
Chapter Two
Literature Review
“Even if the word justice is defined in different ways, from human rights groups 
to the government, for the victims… I think the issue is how do we move on.  The 
tribunal, to me, is the last solution to Cambodia’s genocide.”
--Youk Chhang, Head of Cambodian Non-Government Organization20
“The truth is Hun Sen has no intention of allowing any meaningful tribunal to 
judge the Khmer Rouge crimes of excess.”
--Bangkok Post, 200521
20
 See Samantha Brown, “Khmer Rouge Tribunal: a Race Against Time as Debates Rage,” Agence France 
Press, Global Policy Forum, 14 Apr. 2005, 20 Aug. 2005 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/cambodia/2005/0414farcical.htm>.
16
“Silence poses its own dangers, however.  If we do not seek to analyze genocide, 
then it becomes a floating signifier of evil, appropriated at will for moral 
condemnation or contained in ways that make us feel more comfortable… to 
reflect on genocide, then, is not just to explore evil but also to gain greater insight 
into ourselves and the society in which we live.  Furthermore, if we do not attempt 
to understand the etiology of genocide, we will be unable to prevent its 
recurrence.”
--Alexander Hinton22
I.  Introduction
In order to make progress in the research question that leads this project, it is 
imperative that I first define the commanding concepts that are at the heart of this 
research.  These concepts are those of post-colonization, genocide, transitional justice, 
and emerging democracy.  The purpose of exploring these concepts and contextualizing 
them in the situation of Cambodia is to lay out a common understanding of these issues 
between the reader and the researcher by pointing out the social, political, and 
developmental challenges that underlie the field of transitional justice in Cambodia.  I 
want to make clear, however, that the working definitions that I provide are important for 
the crucial element of the phenomenon under consideration.  But I hasten to add that I 
will not enter into the complex and extensive debates that surround each concept.  In this 
chapter, then, I only provide a working definition of the concepts and explain their 
importance to this study.  I conclude by recapitulating the concepts and their application 
to Cambodia today.
II.  Post-Colonization
A.  Working definition
21
 “Khmer Tribunal Stalled Again,” Global Policy Forum, Aug. 22, 2005, 5 Sept. 2005 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/cambodia/2005/0822stall.htm>.
22 Why Did They Kill?: Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2005) 4-5.
17
The aftermath of colonization has raised many questions in the fields of state-
building, international politics, and social and economic development, especially as it 
pertains to the emergence of the state after colonization.  Here, one confronts such 
questions as: what are the factors that contribute to state-building?  What institutions are 
implemented and for what purposes?  What are the key actors partaking in the state 
formation, how does the country maintain or discontinue its relationship with the 
colonizer, and how is legitimacy, if at all, obtained from the people?  In the context of 
Cambodia and its current challenge of transitional justice, I hold that it is important to 
look back at the factors that contributed to the rise of the state of Cambodia when it 
gained its independence in 1954, the choices that were made with regards to state 
formation, and the challenges of sovereignty and state-building that affected Cambodia 
then and that continue to this day. 
Although there exist different interpretations of the notion of the state,23 the 
following features have been held as central to the modern state today:
First, the state is identified with and claims proprietary jurisdiction over a specific 
territorial area… second, the state enjoys sovereignty: it possesses a single source 
of ultimate legal authority from which all other institutions derive their legal 
authority … third, the state is not a community of communities but an association 
of socially abstracted individuals who constitute its ultimate ontological limits and 
are the sole bearers of rights and obligations … fourth, the structure and 
institutions of the state are based on a single set of principles, enshrined in its 
constitution and imparting to the state its singular, unambiguous, definitive and 
non-negotiable identity… fifth, all its citizens enjoy equal rights … sixth, to be a 
citizen is to be a socially transcendent being directly and identically related to the 
state … seventh, the state has a single and uniform system of laws in the twofold 
sense that the same laws apply throughout its territory and that all its citizens are 
subject to the same laws… eighth, members of the state form a single and 
homogeneous people, and qua people they are sovereign.24
23
 Martin Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
1.
24
 Martin Doornbos and Sudipta Kaviraj, Dynamics of State Formation: India and Europe Compared
(London: Sage Publications, 1997) 191-192.
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Before I embrace these general characterizations of the state along the notions of 
territory, legitimacy, order, justice, and social cohesion, I must first mention how such 
theories of the state have been associated with European state formation experiences.  
Indeed, when one examines the works of scholars like Opello, Rosow, Doornbos, 
Kaviraj, Schulze, and Fisk, one can see that a major portion of current academic research 
has been modeled on the understandings of the state based on European state formations.  
However, given that the emergence of the state in post-colonization era followed these 
same models or was based on these same assumptions of what the state should be, I also 
want to consider the concept of state formation with its relation to post-colonization.  
Whereas European states emerged between the 16th and 18th centuries, “pioneering a 
political organization based on a new understanding of sovereignty,”25 the concept of the 
state in Asia was adapted historically late.  As Doornbos and Kaviraj explain, Asia 
“contained some of the most ancient, most hierarchical, and most powerful empires of all 
time, where both Asia and Africa displayed a bewildering variety of political systems 
ranging all the way from the loosest tribes without rulers to strongly governed, relatively 
stable chiefdoms, emirates, and sutanates.”26  Colonization meant the conquest and 
control of a people’s land and the destruction of pre- or non-capitalist forms of social 
organization, with the imposition of one country’s ways of life on another and the use of 
another country’s resources and peoples for one’s own benefits.27  As a result, post-
colonization signified the breaking away from that imperialist relationship and the 
assertion by the colonized people of their destiny and self-determination.  However, as 
Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman depict, the era of post-colonization dealt with 
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issues of power relations, economic disintegration, and social tensions bequeathed by 
colonial powers.
The end of colonial rule created high hopes for the newly independent countries 
and for the inauguration of a properly post-colonial era, but such optimism was 
relatively short-lived, as the extent to which the West had not relinquished control 
became clear.  This continuing Western influence, located in flexible 
combinations of the economic, the political, the military, and the ideological … 
was named neo-colonialism by Marxists, though the term was quickly taken up by 
leaders of newly or soon to be independent countries.28
Hence, the concept of post-colonization refers to an understanding of the state as a 
territorial entity characterized by sovereignty, institutions, civil society, and social 
cohesion, and complemented by a history of colonial imperialism and the challenges of 
reasserting its identity and position in the greater world order.
B.   Application to the case of Cambodia
When Cambodia gained its independence from France in 1953 after having been 
colonized for almost ninety years, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, then ruler of Cambodia, 
faced several contentious political challenges concerning how political participation, 
development, involvement of foreign powers, and sovereignty should look like for 
Cambodia.  Cambodia had functioned on the premise that the king or “monarch was a 
semi-divine ruler with absolute secular power and the benediction of gods.”29  As a result, 
Prince Sihanouk “saw Cambodia as his own paradise, [envisaging his role] as designating 
a state to protect Cambodia and keep out unwanted foreign or modern influences that 
might disrupt the largely rural, Buddhist life in his kingdom.”30  In order to implement his 
project of state formation, Prince Sihanouk abdicated the throne in 1955 to his father and 
28
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formed his own party, the Sangkum Reastr Niyum, or Popular Socialist Community.31
While the Sangkum earned popular support, Sihanouk was adamant on suppressing 
political opposition, especially when it came to the communist party.
For Sihanouk, the task at hand with Cambodia was the gaining of legitimacy and 
sovereignty, both domestically and internationally.  Programs were implemented at 
reforming the educational system, especially as the French had neglected Cambodian 
educational access throughout its colonial rule.  Although by 1967 there were over one 
million educated youth in Cambodia, or 20 percent of the Khmer population, the lack of 
economic development accompanying these educational advancements created a sense of 
destabilization.  As Elizabeth Becker notes:
The inability of most educated youth, partly because of the undeveloped 
economy, to find qualified employment, together with their detachment from 
traditional culture, proved an explosive combination.  ‘This education tended to 
create a larger and larger core of ‘detribalized’ young people, who no longer 
identified with their cultural context, their hierarchy and their political symbolism.  
This led therefore to a rupture between the State and the youth.’32
In addition to this disenfranchisement, Sihanouk’s vision of the state as 
an entity to be separated from the modern and international forces created tensions with 
the countryside.  With no economic reforms pertaining to land ownership and 
indebtedness,
most consumer goods were not usually within the reach of peasants, nor was 
modern farming equipment.  Obviously, there was a potential for many peasant to 
welcome serious reforms, such as the abolition of usury and the establishment of 
marketing cooperatives, as well as a more equitable redistribution of land.33
As corruption emerged and pervaded throughout Sihanouk’s government, the state’s 
stability, legitimacy, and social cohesion began to be challenged.  As Sophal Ear writes, 
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“corruption was endemic… everyone was involved, either receiving or giving bribes.  
You have to pay a bribe to get a birth certificate for your child.  For your driver’s license.  
Money talked and you could get away with almost anything as long as you have it.”34  In 
other words, it is clear that as Cambodia underwent its processes of post-colonial state-
formation, the issues of legitimacy, sovereignty, stability, social cohesion, and order were 
tasks that it had to deal with.  For Sihanouk, reasserting Cambodia’s independence and 
self-determination by freeing itself from foreign influence was seen as key to upholding 
its sovereignty and legitimacy.  But as I have suggested, such policies faced 
disagreements, not only from the political sphere but also from the social arena.
Having contextualized the situation of state-formation in the immediate period 
post-colonization, the next step is to shed light on the significance of this concept to 
today’s processes of transitional justice.  As I have intimated in the previous chapter, the 
issues involved in the post-colonial era persist today with Hun Sen’s Government and its 
attempts at gaining legitimacy and asserting sovereignty within the international context.  
Hun Sen, by taking a steadfast approach in leading the processes of creating a tribunal for 
the Khmer Rouge, has faced criticism from the international community while also being 
regarded by some Cambodians as exercising the rights of Cambodia to sovereignty and 
self-determination.  Again, the issue of freeing Cambodia from foreign powers and 
asserting itself emerge, as they did with state-formation post-colonization.  In other 
words, this concept delves into the reconciliation of colonial pasts and humiliated 
histories with national state formation and sovereignty.  On transitional justice, such a 
concept continues to play a role with regards to the political challenges that arise between 
the Hun Sen Government and the international community.
34
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III.  Genocide
A.  Working definition
In the field of transitional justice, the term genocide has been used freely and at 
times irresponsibly, with the assumption that everyone understands what genocide is.  
Indeed, this assumption of the common sense of genocide is discussed by William 
Rubinstein, when he writes that:
Rather surprisingly, there is no agreed definition of ‘genocide,’ and it is simply 
not the case that what might be termed the ‘common sense’ definition of 
‘genocide’ is universally accepted.  To the average person, ‘genocide’ is likely to 
mean the deliberate and intentional killing of all or most of a specified group of 
people simply because they are members of that group and for no other reason… 
yet almost everything in this ‘common sense’ definition of genocide has been 
questioned, both by scholars and international law; even—remarkably—whether 
genocide must necessarily entail the killing of anyone.35
Today, the literature on the concept of genocide has stemmed in part from the United 
Nations’ definition of genocide according to its 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  In this document, genocide refers to 
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
nation, ethnic, or religious group, such as:
a) killing members of the group;
b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life designed to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.36
When this definition of genocide is used, however, several complications arise, especially 
as they pertain to the UN definition’s ambiguities and limitations.  As Rubinstein 
indicates, “through Soviet pressure, the UN definition excluded political mass killings 
where no ethnic basis for the killings existed: it is doubtful, for instance, if Pol Pot’s mass 
murders could be classified as ‘genocide’ under the UN definition, or the victims of most 
35
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of Stalin’s Purges.”37  In addition, the issue of intention is another controversy within this 
UN definition of genocide.  If we look at instances of depopulation that some would 
characterize as genocide, often times the element of intent is lacking.  One only needs to 
analyze the experiences of indigenous peoples in North and South America and the 
effects of virulent diseases introduced by Europeans, which were not necessarily intended 
to kill or exterminate a whole or part of a group, but that nevertheless resulted in mass 
killings of millions of indigenous peoples.  In light of these shortcomings, the main 
criticisms of the Genocide Convention have hence been on “1) the exclusion of political 
and social groups from those deemed worthy of protection; 2) the exact meaning of the 
intentionality clause in the Convention (Article II); and 3) the absence of an international 
enforcement mechanism in the form of an international penal tribunal.”38
Despite these shortcomings, some scholars, such as Helen Fein and Leo Kuper, 
still believe that the UN definition is fundamentally a working one.  As Kuper states, the 
Genocide Convention “provides a workable definitional core for interdisciplinary 
analysis and application, and it is the legally accepted definition that has been 
incorporated in a convention ratified by the great majority of the member states of the 
United Nations.  Moreover, it provides some possibilities for preventive action.”39  For 
others, however, such as Frank Chalk and Israel Charny, the working definition created 
by the UN is flawed and useless given its ambiguities and exclusion of political and 
social groups in its definition of genocide.  In response, Chalk has derived his own 
definition based on research of over thirty cases of genocide, where he defines genocide 
as “a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy 
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a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.”40  Moreover, 
on the issue of intent, the debate has been over how to prove intent and to what extent 
intent is to be demonstrated.  According to Fein, “intent can be demonstrated by showing 
a pattern of purposeful action,” leading to the destruction of a significant part of the 
targeted groups, while for scholar Michael Dobkowski, intent “is becoming increasingly 
difficult to locate … because of the anonymous and amorphous structural forces that 
dictate the character of our world.”41
Hence, current debates on the definition of genocide point to the legal, social, and 
political conditions that surround the definition and that some have viewed as 
undermining the concept.  For the field of transitional justice, these debates have 
significant meaning, as they purport not only to the legal technicalities surrounding the 
acknowledgment of historical experiences and sufferings of a people, but also to the issue 
of accountability that is involved within the current UN definition of genocide. 
B.   Application to the case of Cambodia
At implication with the examination of the debate over genocide is the question of 
how the debate affects processes of transitional justice for Cambodia.  As I have 
demonstrated, the Genocide Convention restricts genocide to national, ethnic, or religious 
targeting, leaving out political motives.  As a result, under the UN Genocide Convention, 
what took place under the Khmer Rouge is not legally considered genocide, except for 
the Khmer Rouge’s targeting of the Buddhist monkhood, Vietnamese, Chinese, and 
Muslim Cham, and other national minorities.  As Ben Kiernan describes, “the 
Vietnamese community was entirely eradicated.  More than half of the 400,000-strong 
40
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community had been expelled by the U.S.-backed Lon Nol regime  … more than 100,000 
others were driven out by the Pol Pot regime in the first year after its victory in 1975.  
The rest were simply murdered.”42  Hence, the question becomes: if what took place in 
Cambodia is not legally recognized as genocide, then how can it be characterized to 
encompass the social and psychological degrees of what took place?  In addition, the 
issue also is what are the costs and problems on a societal level that arise from labeling 
this experience as being non-genocidal?
One caution in addressing this question is presented by Jason Abrams, when he 
indicates that “taxonomic debates over whether a case of mass atrocities constitutes 
genocide have sometimes occupied an inflated place in our response to the atrocities; 
thereby obscuring the more important and immediate issue of how to address them, and 
even providing an excuse for inaction.”43 To this day, one way in which legal scholars 
have dealt with this question has been through the labeling of what took place between 
1975 and 1979 under the Khmer Rouge as crimes against humanity.  According to the 
legal definition of crimes against humanity, such crimes are comprised of four elements, 
the first of which has recently been removed by the international community through the 
experiences of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International 
Criminal Court.  Those elements are:
1) that the crime has occurred during, or in the context of, either all-out war or 
armed conflict; 
2) that the crime took place as part of a large-scale pattern of behavior that was 
either widespread or systematic and directed against civilians;
3) that the crime was motivated on a particular characteristic of the victim or 
group; and
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4) that state action, whether affirmative or negligent, contributed to the crime.44
With this definition of crimes against humanity, therefore, the actions undertaken by the 
Khmer Rouge could be prosecutable on the basis of political grounds.  
Given the inapplicability of the term “genocide” to political killings that took 
place in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge and the use instead of crimes against 
humanity, one must consider then the impact that not using “genocide” can have 
psychologically and socially on Cambodia’s victims and their families.  Although 
Abrams holds that the definition of an episode of mass atrocities should not be the 
preoccupying factor, but rather that the focus should be placed “on creating an 
understanding of the full range of core international crimes and a recognition that they are 
all serious and worthy,” he nonetheless concludes that the legal challenges involved in 
the present definition of genocide is inadequate and in need of expansion to encompass 
real-life experiences.45 In this thesis, I agree that labeling what happened under the 
Khmer Rouge as genocide, even if it was auto-genocide, triggers emotions and an 
acknowledgment of the suffering and history of a people on a collective basis that is 
particular to that term.  For the situation of Cambodia, therefore, this debate over the 
definition of genocide is very much relevant as it pertains to a victim-centered approach 
that acknowledges the victims’ suffering.  Unlike Scott Luftglass, who mentions that
“crimes against humanity seems to be the more appropriate classification of the Khmer 
Rouge atrocities,”46 I am of the same opinion as Abrams that genocide as is defined under 
the UN Genocide Convention needs revisiting, so that the suffering of millions of people 
under the Khmer Rouge can be acknowledged and justice be achieved.   
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IV.  Transitional Justice
A.  Working definition
For the purposes of this study, I define transitional justice as the processes of 
acknowledging and confronting a country’s past, usually characterized by mass atrocities, 
by restoring an understanding of truth, reconciliation, memory, history, and humanity 
focused on the experiences of the victims in order for a society to move forward.  
Transitional justice is made up of “processes of trials, purges, and reparations that take 
place after the transition from one political regime to another.”47  To this day, 
mechanisms that have been used to bring about transitional justice have included 
tribunals, truth and reconciliation commissions, museums, public forums, cultural 
practices, and amnesties.  For some scholars, like Juan Méndez, transitional justice “is an 
urgent task of democratization, as it highlights the fundamental character of the new 
order to be established, an order based on the rule of law and on respect for the dignity 
and worth of each person.”48  For others, like David Crocker, transitional justice is seen as 
being based on a set of morally defensible goals, among which are the objectives of truth, 
public platform for victims, accountability and sanctions, rule of law, compensation to 
victims, institutional reform, democratization and economic development, and public 
deliberation.49  But as with the concept of genocide, debates over how and whether 
transitional justice should take place are present, given the challenges over how to restore 
truth and justice in an effective and objective way without falling into the impulse of 
pursuing revenge.  
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The current debate on the issue of transitional justice is dominated by the views 
that 1) transitional justice should be about reconciliation through a forgive-and-forget 
policy; 2) transitional justice should take place through legal avenues and the 
enhancement of the rule of law; 3) transitional justice should take into account the legal, 
political, social, and psychological contexts in order to ensure that society does not 
disintegrate; and 4) transitional justice should seek to establish justice centered on the 
survivors and victims.  One such view, the legalist perspective, holds that international 
law and international humanitarian and human rights law must be stressed and enforced 
through the creation of tribunals in order to ensure peace and justice.  According to this 
view, tribunals and respect for the rule of law helps to prevent and deter future conflicts 
by placing guilt and showing to the public that such atrocities will not go unpunished.50
Indeed, Minow argues to this effect that “trials contribute to the project of international 
criminal justice by helping to ‘articulate both norms and a commitment to work to realize 
them … even prosecutions, and convictions can build up the materials of international 
human rights and the notions of individual responsibility, conscience, and human dignity 
that imbue them.”51  Unlike the legalists, consequentialists and pragmatists claim that 
transitional justice must take into account the political, social, and economic contexts of 
the society.  For the pragmatists and consequentialists, therefore, transitional justice is 
limited by circumstances, especially as they pertain to political realities.  For instance, 
Jack Goldsmith and Stephen Krasner hold that legalists and idealists fail to take into 
account the factor of power and its impact on possibilities of transitional justice.52  In 
addition to these views is the emotional psychology approach, which holds that 
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transitional justice should be about developing “an explanatory account of the 
establishment of social peace in the wake of widespread atrocities, and second, to derive 
policy prescriptions from that explanatory account.”53  Advocates for this approach 
usually support truth commissions because of the cathartic truth telling potential that such 
a mechanism holds for the survivors and their families.
Although these debates provide important discussions as to how and why 
transitional justice should take place, I hold that following one approach as being the 
right one is ineffective.  Instead, I assert that taking into account all perspectives of 
transitional justice are crucial for effective transitional justice, as long as the formulations 
of justice revolve around the needs of the victims and their families.  Unlike the 
emotional psychology theorists, I believe that justice can be beneficial to the victims even 
if it is brought in the context of trials and tribunals.  And like the pragmatists and 
consequentialists, I agree that contexts must be taken into account in order to understand 
the limits and possibilities of transitional justice, because transitional justice is “a series 
of legislative, administrative, and legal decisions.”54  As Ruti Teitel declares, “the role of 
[transitional justice] in periods of political change is explored by looking at its various 
forms: punishment, historical inquiry, reparations, purges, and constitution making.”55  In 
the end, therefore, transitional justice should be about knowledge and acknowledgment 
and about responding to the demand of justice for the victims.56
B.  Application to the case of Cambodia
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Where Ben Kiernan and Elizabeth Becker have called for justice to take place 
through the implementation of a tribunal, I hold that the working definition of this study 
provides several areas of contention to consider before such conclusions can be reached.
On the level of political, social, and economic realities, the questions become: 
what are the barriers and the challenges that the Cambodian government and international 
community face and must address in order to establish effective mechanisms of 
transitional justice?  For the Cambodian government, or the Hun Sen government, these 
political elements include political instability that might ensue from the prosecution of 
the Khmer Rouge, not only because of the threats made by Khmer Rouge leaders, but 
also because of the potential revelation of involvement of members within the Hun Sen 
government if transitional justice takes place.  For the international community, these 
challenges also arise with regards to reputation and how effectively international 
standards of justice can be followed.
On the issue of respect for the rule of law and transition, the working definition of 
transitional justice calls for the assessment of the extent to which transitional justice can 
be achieved through the courts.  As mentioned, taking the legal path to reconcile with a 
past of mass atrocities requires that the legal avenue is indeed objective and capable of 
achieving the goals of transitional justice.  Ways that have been used to make this 
assessment have included the selection of judges, absence of corruption, protection for 
the victims and perpetrators, and procedures of due process.
Finally, given that the goals of transitional justice are to acknowledge, examine, 
and uncover truth, history, memory, dignity, and justice in order to help victims and their 
families heal and move forward, the task is to assess whether the mechanisms of 
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transitional justice that are being implemented in Cambodia will indeed fulfill these 
needs.  And it is this task that I undertake in chapter four.
V. Emerging Democracy and the Rebuilding of Public Support
A.  Working definition
The last concept that I define for the purposes of this research study is that of 
emerging democracy and the issue of building public support post-mass atrocities.  In 
doing so, I first state that the definition of democracy that I use is minimalist, that is, I 
seek only to “focus on the smallest possible number of attributes that are still seen as 
producing a viable standard for democracy.”57  Hence, emerging democracy refers to a 
transition of political environments in which democratic elements are voiced and put into 
place, such as the contested elections with full suffrage and the effective guarantees of 
civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, assembly, and association guaranteed under the 
law,58 in order for a society to regain a sense of identity and connection with the state 
after events of mass atrocities or gross human rights violations.  Moreover, I complement 
this definition with the aspects of institutionalization and legitimacy that are integral for 
the effective implementation and sustainability of democratic processes in such societies.  
As Mehran Kamrava indicates, “the political processes that [must take place in order to 
create a new sense of identity and connection between the state and society is one that] 
can in large measure be summed up as the efforts to attain institutionalization and 
legitimacy.”59  The element of institutionalization in the process of emerging democracies 
hence refers to the creation of institutions and structures that serve as the nexus between 
society and the state.  Institutionalization is about creating popular compliance from the 
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society to the state.  Moreover, the element of legitimacy addresses the emotional and 
psychological link between the state and its people.  Legitimacy is encompassed in the 
norms and practices that the state employs in order to create a sense of viability for itself 
through the acceptance, approval, or support from its society.  According to Kamrava, 
there exist five broad mechanisms in which the state can gain and sustain legitimacy, 
which include 1) charismatic authority, or the absolute and unwavering devotion of the 
masses to their leader on the basis of the leader’s image and/or personality; 2) 
patrimonialism, or the resonance of personal loyalties not only between the people and 
their leader but also between political incumbents and their successive echelons; 3) 
clientalist relations, or a patron-client relationship/loyalty; 4) the appeal to ideology or to 
emotionally significant historical events; and 5) politically inclusionary policies aimed at 
expanding a regime’s popular support base, or the infusion of the state and society in 
order to build legitimacy through mass participation of society in political processes.60  In 
other words, as developing societies transition between political environments and move 
toward a democracy-building process, the challenges of creating and maintaining public 
support is crucial for the viability of the state and its political processes and for the 
moving beyond a history of gross human rights violations.
B.  Application to the case of Cambodia
For Cambodia today, the application of democracy and the rebuilding of public 
support has taken on two different meanings.  On one hand, the political transition of 
Cambodia from an authoritarian, Lenin-like leadership to one of democracy was meant to 
signify the potential transition needed for Cambodia to move beyond its past of human 
rights violations towards one based on the rebuilding of civil society, voice, and freedom.  
60
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As the work of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 
demonstrates, democracy through general elections was thought to be the answer to 
Cambodia’s political transition.  But as the elections took place and political struggles 
began to arise, as had been common in Cambodia’s political history, the model of 
democracy envisioned by UNTAC was not realized.  Following Hun Sen’s coup d’état 
against Prince Ranariddh in 1997, the Hun Sen Government has continued to work 
towards the implementation and sustaining of democracy and the rebuilding of public 
support; however, the reasons for doing so have been to maintain political authority and 
legitimacy, rather than for the vision embodied by UNTAC.  Hence, the second meaning 
of democracy today has been shaped in part by Hun Sen’s political goals, which are to 
gain and maintain legitimacy and sovereignty in the eyes of not only Cambodia’s citizens 
but also the international community.
As we observe with the creation of the Khmer Rouge tribunal today, Hun Sen has 
relied on the mechanisms of democracy-building and legitimacy-building mentioned by 
Kamrava, such as appeal to history and inclusionary political policies, in order to enhance 
his political image and sovereignty.  Although it is true that Hun Sen continues to follow 
democratic processes, such as national elections and the use of the parliament, it is 
important to keep in mind the political motives that underlie these measures and the 
deviating meaning that democracy has taken in comparison to the original intentions of 
UNTAC.  In other words, by raising the issue of democracy and the rebuilding of public 
support for countries with past of gross human rights atrocities, it is my intent to show the 
contradictory functions that the idea of democracy has undergone.  With the emergence 
of transitional mechanisms of the tribunal, it is hence important to recognize the political 
melée that is inherent within the proceedings. 
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Chapter Three
Background Overview
“Cambodia is the last trace of a once grand Khmer Empire which spanned parts 
of Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Malaysia.  The home of one of the largest man-
made monuments in the world, the temple-complex of Angkor Wat built in the 12th
century.”
--Sophal Ear61
“Today’s society is corrupted and won over by the cult of the individual, which 
we must abolish at all costs.  We live in a sick society since the return to peace.  
All brave and honest children of the fatherland must join the revolutionary party 
in order to move the country towards communist socialism.  The capitalists who 
live in affluence at the expense of the working class and the masses, do not 
hesitate to resort to grand methods to obtain luxuries and gratify their passions.  
The masses live in misery, bled by them.  The aim of the revolution is the 
liberation of the people from the capitalists and feudalists.  To succeed it is 
necessary to resort to force.”
--Extracts from Khmer Rouge pamphlet62
“On the ground, [American] invasion pushed the battlefields farther westward 
into the heavily populated villages and rice fields around and beyond the Mekong 
river.  The Lon Nol government roved itself unable to defend the country, and it 
entered into a dependence upon foreign aid [with the United States] that would 
eventually choke it… By the end of 1970, the government was spending five times 
its revenue and earning nothing abroad.  The rubber plantations in the east of the 
country were burned down, bombed or occupied by the Communists; thousands of 
hectares of paddy field had been abandoned, and those still being harvested, 
around the city of Battambang, were required for domestic consumption.  Within 
a few months, the country’s economic independence was destroyed.”
--William Shawcross63
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“In April 1975, the Khmer Rouge took Phnom Penh, after a protracted armed 
struggle against the rule of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the corrupt and inept 
Lon Nol regime which followed it.  As its core goal, the regime sought the 
creation of a pure Khmer nation, completely self-reliant and free from the 
influence of perceived foreign and class enemies.”
--Jason Abrams64
I.  Introduction
As I have argued in the introduction of this work, understanding 
the possibilities of transitional justice in Cambodia first requires an examination and a 
contextualization of the historical, social, and political factors that have shaped Cambodia 
into what it is today.  In this chapter, I offer a synoptic background and make the 
following assertions: 1) Cambodia’s once greatness under the Khmer Empire contributed 
to more deeply felt humiliation at the hands of occupation and colonization under France, 
and eventually, at the foreign influence imposed by the United States on Cambodia 
during the Vietnam War; 2) Cambodia’s social and political decay had been an 
exacerbating problem beginning with Cambodia’s independence in 1954 and following 
Lon Nol’s rule during the early 1970s; 3) Cambodia’s political and social instability and 
growing sense of discontent contributed to the rise of the Khmer Rouge; 4) the Khmer 
Rouge, with their militant ideology of communist socialism, aimed at reviving 
Cambodia’s greatness, as experienced under the Khmer Empire, by going back to the 
ideas of a pure Khmer nation, self-reliance and self-subsistence, and detachment from 
foreign influence and ideas; 5) the Khmer Rouge, because of their incessant paranoia and 
fear of betrayal and political uprising, moved away from their political and social goals 
and instead led one-third of Cambodia’s population to their death and mass killings; 6) 
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Cambodia’s political instability and disagreements post-1979 enabled the international 
community to ignore issues of transitional justice for Cambodia; and 7) progresses of 
transitional justice beginning in the 1990s have been slow and politicized.
With this background overview, I move away from the too-tempting need to 
demonize and condemn the Khmer Rouge at the offset, as has been done too often by 
academic scholars.  Instead, I choose to delineate the many social, political, and historical 
factors that set the milieu for Cambodia’s political and social developments over the last 
century and that continue to challenge Cambodia’s processes of transitional justice.  In 
doing so, it is my hope that the background overview will shed light on the fact that 
Cambodia’s past of political genocide was not simply an act of pure evil and a people 
gone mad, but rather, a reaction to the conflicting emotions of independence, nationalism, 
sovereignty, and self-sufficiency that were effected by colonization, humiliation, 
bombing, foreign dominance, corruption, and political instability.  In addition, the 
background contextualizes the issue of transitional justice and lack thereof post-1979 not 
solely on Cambodia but also on the international community.  
II.  Cambodia: From Greatness to Tragedy
Cambodia’s glorious past is a time that contributed and continues to play 
a crucial role in the identity and national inspirations of its people.  For the Khmer 
Rouge, the medieval glory under the Khmer Empire inspired them to seek to transform 
Cambodia back to an age of self-sufficiency, prestige, and sovereignty, whereas for 
Cambodians today, the achievements during the Angkorian époque has been a means by 
which to take pride again in their country and their identity in order to move forward 
from a past of mass atrocities.  What I do next, therefore, is briefly examine the once-
37
greatness associated with Cambodia that has shaped dreams and contributed to deeply felt 
humiliations.
As Ben Kiernan points, Cambodia’s medieval glory was a “substantial corpus of 
inscriptions and archaeological sites like the twelfth-century Hindu temple of Angkor 
Wat.”65  During the Angkorian-Khmer Empire between the 9th and 15th centuries, 
Cambodia lived in glory and prestige as a powerful empire.  Economically, the 
Angkorian kings had introduced a hydraulic economy with advanced irrigation systems 
and canals that led into the waterways of the Mekong delta and that contributed to the 
growth of Cambodia’s economic prosperity and wealth.66  In addition to these innovative 
hydraulic engineering methods, the Khmers of that period had a keen sense of ambition 
and attitude toward culture.  With the ability to borrow ideas from other cultures and 
shaping them to fit their needs, early Khmers adapted Indian culture and Champan 
architecture to sustain their larger framework of building a true empire.  As scholar 
Elizabeth Becker asserts, “the Khmers were among the most brilliant adapters of the new 
Indian culture… the Angkor era, which last six hundred years, proved so powerful that is 
basic institutions survived, however transformed or tattered, until the revolution of the 
Khmer Rouge.”67  Embodying the Hindu religion of the Brahmans, Cambodians came to 
encompass the ideology of deva-raj, or god-king.  The god-king, as the most absolute 
ruler of all tribal lords, came to hold a venerated position among the Khmers until the rise 
of the Khmer Rouge regime.68  Marked by wealth, empire, power, and the popular 
inspiration all-powerful god-king, medieval Cambodia was thus a land of greatness.  As 
its power began to decline and the empire disappeared, Cambodia’s once prosperity was 
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replaced by decay and humiliation at the hands of invasions from neighboring countries, 
and finally, colonization by the French. 
III.  Decay and Humiliation: Invasion and Colonization
Wracked by internal struggles for power, the Khmer empire weakened after the 
15th century, marking Cambodia’s degeneration and deeply felt humiliations in Asia.  
Although evidence and specific documents portraying this decline of power are limited, 
there have been nonetheless some inscriptions and recordings indicating these internal 
battles.  Ben Kiernan writes to this effect that “civil wars wracked the country… a rare 
inscription carved at Angkor in 1747 celebrates the Khmer king’s defeat of an unnamed 
rebel princess.  Tracking down her forces by blocking and searching every road, the royal 
army drove out, pursued and scattered the rebels.”69  As royal family feuds and struggles 
swarmed over Cambodia, the country also became easy prey for geopolitical power gains 
from neighboring Thailand and Vietnam.  By providing military aid to weakened Khmer 
princes and princesses in their attempts to oust one another, Vietnam and Thailand used 
these geopolitical alliances to gain rights over Cambodian territory, all the while using 
their military forces to openly attack embattled Khmer kingdoms.  As Becker indicates, 
“princes… would plead for military aid from Siam (Thailand) or Vietnam to oust a rival 
claimant.  In return, the petitioning prince or princess routinely gave up rights over 
Cambodian territory … Thailand and later Vietnam [also] regularly defeated Khmer 
armies and annexed Khmer territory.”70  Before the colonization of Cambodia by France 
in the 1860s, “Cambodia was under the joint protection of Vietnam and Siam.”71  As a 
result, many Khmers at the time questioned whether their once great land of Cambodia 
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would eventually become extinct.  King Norodom, pressured to save his country, was 
thus convinced by the French to have Cambodia become a protectorate of France.  
Whereas invasions from neighboring Thailand and Vietnam had been the beginning of 
decline and humiliation for the Cambodian people, France’s domination and eventual 
colonization of Cambodia further amplified Cambodia’s weakened status and loss of 
prestige.
Partaking in the European nations’ race to lay claim to the riches of the Orient, the 
French saw the Mekong River and its surroundings as the southern road to China and its 
wealth.72  Intending to use Cambodia as a buffer between Thailand and its more prized 
colony of Vietnam, the French convinced King Norodom to become a French 
protectorate, with the French agreeing to protect Cambodia’s throne from claims by the 
Vietnamese or Thais.73  As a result, King Norodom signed the 1863 and 1864 treaties 
with France and officially made Cambodia a French protectorate.  Holding Cambodians 
as lazy and simple and noble savages with a great but lost civilization,74 the French told 
King Norodom that he would be allowed to control his country, while France would have 
control over Cambodia’s foreign policy.75  For the French, Cambodia was therefore only a 
small matter, with their higher goals of reaching China via the Mekong River.76
By 1883, it became clear to the French that the Mekong would not provide the 
route to China as they had intended, and thus, Cambodia’s usefulness had to be realized 
in other ways.  As the French came to play a more active role in Cambodia through the 
imposition of taxes on opium and alcohol and eventually Cambodia’s customs service, 
local uprisings ensued at the lost of Cambodian control over their internal affairs and 
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France’s imposed collection of taxes.77  Following local uprisings and the affront by King 
Norodom against French authorities, France “eventually took full control over 
[Cambodia’s] administration, its financial and legal systems, and its commercial 
affairs.”78  Cambodia, therefore, became a source of revenue for the benefit of France and 
its colonial administration in Vietnam.  “Cambodia would support France and Vietnam 
but would receive nothing in return… the French had decided that the Vietnamese were 
the industrious race of the future and the Khmer a lazy doomed people grown decadent 
on Buddhism and the rule of their opulent monarchs.”79  During its 90-year colonial rule, 
France neglected Khmer schools, and by 1954, Cambodia only had 144 Khmer 
Baccalauréats.80
Although France benefited greatly from its colonization of Cambodia, it 
nonetheless provided some benefits for Cambodia.  As Becker states:
they protected the country from invasions by neighbors… but perhaps the most 
profound fruit of the French presence in Cambodia was the seemingly arcane 
pursuit by a handful of French scholars to uncover the history of Cambodia.  The 
results of their scholarship were nothing less than the recovery of Khmer pride in 
their country’s heritage and the ideological foundation of the modern drive for an 
expression of an independent Khmer nation.81
Hence, France’s revival of Cambodia’s past achievements under the Khmer Empire 
provided the basis for Cambodians to take pride again in their heritage; however, it also 
provided the foundations for national movements to spring up and demands for 
independence to engender.  Communist revolutionary groups, comprised of Khmer and 
Vietnamese forces, played an important role in fighting French colonialists.  One 1949 
document states, “Khmer and Vietnamese revolutionary organizations ‘must live side by 
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side to help one another, to exchange initiatives and lessons drawn from experience… to 
conclude on the basis of equality an alliance in the struggle against the …French 
colonialists, invaders of Cambodia and of Vietnam.’”82  By 1953, after a few decades of 
rebellions and attempts by groups like the Khmer Krom, United Issarak Front, and 
communist groups under Keo Meas and Son Ngoc Minh to liberate Cambodia, Cambodia 
was awarded independence.  Although I do not provide a critical examination of the 
movements, groups, and events that contributed to Cambodia’s independence, it is 
nonetheless clear that the deeply felt humiliation and antagonism of being subjected to 
the domination of France and the renewed national pride were important factors that 
emerged from France’s colonization of Cambodia between 1863 and 1953 and that led 
the country to gain its independence on November 9, 1953.
IV.  Rise of the Khmer Rouge: Corruption, Poverty, and Political Instability
As I mentioned earlier, in order to comprehend why a group like the Khmer 
Rouge could rise to power in Cambodia, the political, social, and economic conditions of 
the society must be examined.  In this section, I investigate the period following 
independence, which was marked by events like Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s abdication 
of the throne for political life, the ongoing conflict between his political party, the 
Sangkum Reastr Niyum (People’s Socialist Community), and the communists, the rise of 
corruption and decadence in Khmer political, social, and economic life, and finally, the 
involuntary involvement of Cambodia in the US-Vietnam War.  As I demonstrate, all 
these events created in one way or another the conditions necessary for the Khmer Rouge 
to rise to power. 
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By 1953, the Khmer Issarak Association, spearheaded by its communist backbone 
organization, the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party, had built up a strong communist 
movement from its anti-colonial activities.  As Kiernan indicates to this effect, the 
movement “had an army of five thousand Cambodian fighters from the two largest 
sectors of Cambodian life: the peasantry and the monkhood.  Out of this nationalist 
struggle, the first precondition for Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea had been realized: a 
viable communist party had emerged on the Cambodian political scene.”83  However, 
when Cambodia ceased to be a French protectorate in 1953, King Norodom SKing 
Norodom Sihanouk saw the advantages of partaking in political life and thus abdicated 
the throne to his father in 1955.  As a result of his political involvement and 
pronouncement of being the father of Cambodian independence, Sihanouk attracted 
broad popular support and led those Issaraks who had been motivated by the struggle and 
not the communist ideology of the group to return to civilian life. 84  For the rest of the 
political groups working towards opposition to his group, the King launched a series of 
military operations against the Communist rebels, all the while seeking to absorb and 
dissolve all other political parties.85  For Sihanouk, therefore, his role was to become the 
leader and champion of Cambodia, helping the country move towards “modernization, 
socialism, neutrality, and independence.”86
The first free elections were promised to be held in 1955.  With his own political 
party, the Sangkum, Sihanouk used his charm and promises of patronage to convince 
“most of the rightists and centrists to abolish their small parties and join the Sangkum.  
Only the leftists and the rightists supporters of Son Ngoc Thanh remained to compete 
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with the prince.”87  During the elections campaign, members of the left-leaning party, the 
Pracheachun, were arrested and jailed.  In addition, the Democratic Party was targeted, 
with one candidate jailed and one leader fired upon by Sihanouk’s police.88  In the end, 
through intimidation, violence, and relentless propaganda, but also with the help of his 
own personal popularity among Cambodian peasants, Sihanouk won the elections.89  As 
Becker states, “Sihanouk’s Sangkum captured every seat.”90
To preserve his power and ensure absolute loyalty from his members, Sihanouk 
continued his strong hold in the Cambodian political arena.  According to Becker, 
“Sihanouk was not gracious in victory.  He struck back at the communists fiercely, 
unwilling to allow them any role in his country.  He did so not only to preserve his total 
control but also out of fear that they were subservient to the Vietnamese communists and, 
therefore, a foothold for future Vietnamese expansion.”91  Although Sihanouk managed to 
destroy nearly 90 percent of the rural cadre within the communist group, where some had 
been murdered, others quit in fears of their lives, and others escaped to Vietnam, 
Sihanouk’s forces in the end gave rise to a new leadership within the communist group, 
among which was Pol Pot.  As Kiernan states, Sihanouk’s “erratic repression of the left 
played into the hands of the younger party group.  Sihanouk’s secret police suppressed 
the orthodox grassroots KPRP veterans, partly because of their historical affinity with 
Hanoi, while sparing younger, educated militants with more privileged backgrounds.”92
Eventually, the leadership of urban educated students grew in importance, and in early 
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1963, the Pol Pot leadership took over leadership of the communist party.93  In the end, 
therefore, Sihanouk’s efforts contributed to the rise of a more militant, French-educated, 
and anti-Vietnamese leadership within the communist party, rather than worked towards 
destroying the communist party entirely.
Despite Sihanouk’s covert political activities to destroy the communist party, 
Sihanouk’s rule and diplomatic abilities between the late 1950s and early 1960s has still 
been remembered by many Cambodians as Cambodia’s golden moment.  As Gottesman 
depicts,
the country enjoyed neutrality and relative peace while maintaining a functioning, 
if inequitable, economy.  Cambodia exported rice, rubber, and pepper and 
received foreign aid from France, the United States, and the Sino-Soviet bloc.  
This assistance not only helped build hospitals, schools, and a transportation 
infrastructure but also ensured that, despite corruption and inefficiency, enough 
money trickled down to ward off hunger and discontent.  Phnom Penh buzzed 
with cultural glories, all of which owed their patronage to Sihanouk… on one 
level, the affable, accessible Sihanouk was extremely popular, especially in the 
countryside, where Cambodian peasants adored him, not just as royalty but as the 
embodiment of Cambodia itself.  In the capital and in the larger towns, however, 
many Cambodians blamed him for condoning corruption and political 
intimidation.94
As corruption became widespread throughout Cambodian society, however, Sihanouk’s 
golden moment came to be replaced by discontent, opposition, and political instability in 
the 1960s onward, worsening when Cambodia entered the Vietnam War and Sihanouk 
was deposed.  As Sophal Ear describes, “corruption was everywhere.  Corruption was 
endemic, even at the universities… [and] was observable at nearly all levels of 
government.”95  By 1963, protests and instability began to rise in Cambodia, undermining 
Sihanouk’s rule and legitimacy.   
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One such protest occurred in early 1963, when student riots broke out in the 
northwestern Cambodian city of Siem Reap.  Sparked by local grievances, allegations of 
police brutality and corruption, the protest grew into a direct attack on Sihanouk 
himself.96  Caught unaware, Sihanouk blamed the communists for instigating the protest.  
In response, Sihanouk compiled a list of thirty-four names of leftists, for the supposed 
purposes of forming a separate leftist cabinet.  As individuals began to disappear, 
however, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, whose names had been included in the list, escaped to 
the jungle to form a maquis and initiate the struggle to survive and prevail in Cambodia.97
Rather than dissipate the conditions of corruption, economic instability, and public 
discontent that were to blame for the protest, therefore, Sihanouk had driven away the 
communist leadership instead.  And as the Vietnam War escalated in the mid-1960s and 
began to destabilize Sihanouk’s neutral stance in the war, these social and political 
conditions exacerbated, and in the end, provided the opportunity for the Khmer Rouge to 
rise to power.
By 1966, Sihanouk’s power significantly decreased when Sihanouk refused 
American aid to stave off U.S. intervention in Cambodia.98  By forfeiting a large portion 
of the money that had balanced his budget for years, Sihanouk had to reduce his military 
budget.  As the elections approached, Sihanouk decided against an open confrontation 
and “declared he would not select the Sangkum Party’s official slate of candidates.”99  As 
a result, the 1966 new assembly comprised of Lon Nol in power as prime minister, who 
had previously served under Sihanouk as his police chief and security leader, and of 
96
 Becker (1986) 113.
97
 Ibid 114.
98
 Ibid 116.
99
 Ibid 116.
46
Sihanouk’s royal rival, Prince Sirik Matak.100  Sihanouk continued to hold his position as 
head of state.  For Lon Nol, he saw that it had become time to put an end to communist 
opposition.  Hence, with or without Sihanouk’s backing, Lon Nol was intent on 
beginning his clean-up activities of the communist.  As one communist of that period 
writes, “In 1966, I was arrested by Lon Nol agents and imprisoned… for three months.  
We were struggling against exploitation, for rights and freedoms, struggling over produce 
and land, and especially against the district chief of Peam Chor, who had embezzled state 
funds designed for the people.”101  Rather than alleviate the political instability and 
opposition, however, Lon Nol’s efforts encouraged the communists and their leaders to 
commence their social revolution.  And thus, the first civil began in Cambodia in 1967.
“The rebellion that first broke out in Battambang [was] a nationally-organized 
CPK [Communist Party of Kampuchea]-led rebellion, in part provoked by the 
government… repression was fierce, but so was urban unrest.”102  By 1968, Sihanouk 
declared that Cambodia was engulfed in a total war, where civil war had extended to 
other areas throughout the country.103  In response, Lon Nol reinforced his security 
strategies.  According to the internal documents of a 1974 CPK Party History, it was 
described that “beginning in 1967, the enemy, led by Lon Nol, started to destroy, kill, 
make arrests and put people in chains on a large scale, both in the towns and in the 
countryside.”104  For the Khmer Rouge, such government repression provided the 
propaganda needed to receive the support from villagers.  As Kiernan indicates, the 
Khmer Rouge began to use the 1967-1968 repression to portray the tax problem, 
declining standards of living, and Lon Nol’s and Sihanouk’s roles as murderers of 
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patriots.105  By 1969, the political conditions and instabilities in the country worsened as 
the US Air Forces began their secret bombing of Cambodia, on the grounds that 
Vietnamese had sanctuaries along the Eastern coast of Cambodia.  For Sihanouk, the 
maintenance of political neutrality in the Vietnam War became challenged, not only by 
the United States and Vietnam, but also internally by his own administration.
The U.S. secretive bombardment of Cambodia began in 1969.  For Sihanouk, it 
became clear that his stance of neutrality needed to be re-examined.  Although Sihanouk 
understood that he had no alternative, Sihanouk did not approve of the indiscriminate US 
bombings of Cambodian territories.  As Shawcross writes, “American violations of 
Cambodian neutrality were as impossible to prevent as Vietnamese.  Each had to be 
tolerated in the hope that the war could at least be contained a full-scale invasion by the 
United States… could be prevented.”106  According to Kiernan, over the fourteen-month 
period between 1969 and 1970, over 3,600 B-52 raids were conducted against targets in 
Cambodia.  Peasants were killed and Cambodian casualties were very heavy.107
In all the midst of these social disruptions and instabilities that continued to 
undermine Cambodian economy, society, and political life, Lon Nol began to form 
political alliances to overthrow Sihanouk.  In 1970, a coup d’état was launched by Lon 
Nol against Sihanouk, deposing the king who had ruled Cambodia from the inception of 
its independence.  As Lon Nol collaborated with the United States and received economic 
support, conditions of corruption, economic instability, and social decline exacerbated, 
setting the final stage for the Khmer Rouge to rise.  Gottesman portrays:
Social and economic life in Phnom Penh deteriorated as a result of the war and 
the sudden influx of U.S. military assistance.  This aid, which by the beginning of 
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1971 had reached $180 million, found its way to corrupt generals and to officials 
in control of fuel, medicine, and other elements of the economy connected to the 
war effort… before the U.S. Congress put an end to it, in August 1973, U.S. 
planes had dropped three times as much tonnage of bombs on Cambodia as they 
had on Japan in World War II.  The bombing, the resulting lack of available 
farmland, and the insurgency drove more than 750,000 rural Cambodians into the 
cities, hundreds of thousands coming to Phnom Penh alone.  Refugee camps were 
infected with disease; the desperate begged on the streets; social services ceased 
to function; and all elements of the administration rotted with corruption.108
As students joined the Khmer Rouge in response to the degradation of Cambodian social, 
economic, and political life, the Khmer Rouge, now detached from its Vietnamese 
counterpart, raised in power.  On April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge defeated Lon Nol’s 
forces, marking the beginning of the Khmer Rouge’s “Year Zero.”
V. The Khmer Rouge Era: Ideology, Paranoia, and Genocide
Today, scholars have had several interpretations of the Khmer Rouge era between 
1975 and 1979.  David Chandler has asserted that the CPK was “the purest and most 
thoroughgoing Marxist-Leninist movement in an era of revolutions… no other regime 
tried to go so quickly or so far… no other inflicted as many casualties on the country’s 
population.”109  Others, like Kiernan, have concurred that although the CPK accumulated 
unprecedented power during that time period, the regime’s horror and failure resulted 
“from the goals of true reactionaries: their attempts to turn back the clock” and to 
confront the human and material forces of history by seeking to destroy existing social 
groups.110  As Becker writes, “the Khmer Rouge considered themselves ultramodernists.  
They planned to accomplish in a few years the changes Western societies underwent 
during the centuries of their industrial revolutions: secularization, rationalization of 
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production, transformation of a feudal, rural population…and finally, industrialization.”111
Overall, however, what is clear is that the Khmer Rouge, who initially based their 
ideology on the basic notions of Marxism-Leninism revolution and the inspirations of 
self-reliance, independence, racial homogeneity, and mastery, failed to achieve their 
revolution and instead led to the genocide of over 1.7 million Cambodians.  As I express 
in this section, the Khmer Rouge leadership not only followed its campaign of rectifying 
historical injustice through its assertion of self-sufficiency and racial and national 
exceptionalism, but it was also instilled with fear and paranoia of conspiracy and of the 
enemy, which resulted in the evacuation and purging of millions of Cambodians, ethnic 
Vietnamese, and other minorities, and in the end, in the purging of its own leadership and 
own destabilization.112
When the Khmer Rouge soldiers, dressed in black or green pajamas and heavily 
armed, entered Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, “the new occupiers of the capital were, 
like so many of the Khmer Rouge, thoroughly indoctrinated, utterly obedient to the 
revolution, and filled with contempt for whichever enemies were placed before them.”113
For the people of Phnom Penh, relief washed over, as “life in the city had grown worse; 
the economic crises, the corruption, the refugees, and the violence had led even the most 
anticommunist among them to hope for improvements.”114  However, as the people of 
Phnom Penh and other cities were to experience, the Khmer Rouge were soon to 
implement the eight-point policy advocated for by Pol Pot, starting with the evacuation of 
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the people from all towns.115  As Kiernan states, “the evacuation of Phnom Penh and other 
urban centers was not just an ideological or economic measure but also part of a strategy 
of continuing warfare.  From now on, the Vietnamese were not to be tempted to react by 
‘swallowing’ Kampuchea in a strike against a vulnerable populated capital.”  In addition, 
he writes that:
[the evacuation] was also a sea change in Cambodia’s political demography, 
facilitating both ethnic cleansing and the acquisition of totalitarian power.  Not 
only were the cities effectively Khmerized when their ethnic Chinese and 
Vietnamese majorities were dispersed; without towns, too, citizens became far 
more easy to control.  From now on, there would be no assembled constituency to 
whom dissident or underground political activists could appeal or among whom 
they could quietly work… and no change for an orthodox Marxist or other 
dissident faction to develop a base among a proletariat.116
As Khmer Rouge soldiers pointed their guns at the people of Phnom Penh and 
instructed them to pack lightly to move out, using the pretext of an imminent American 
bombing and the necessity of evacuation, “hundreds of thousands of Cambodians paraded 
out of the city and into the countryside.  Deprived of medicine, food, and water, the old 
and the sick died along the way.  Khmer Rouge soldiers shot many who complained.”117
In addition, military officers of the old Lon Nol regime were ordered to identify 
themselves, many assuming that doing so could save their lives.  Others, like police 
officers, civil servants, teachers, engineers, and doctors were also systematically 
executed, often as a result of their association with the Western world, corrupted views, 
and enmity.118  According to Scott Luftglass, “the Khmer Rouge subscribed to the 
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reasoning that ‘a person who has been spoiled by a corrupt regime cannot be reformed, he 
must be physically eliminated.”119  Submerged in their nationalistic views of racial 
superiority, the Khmer Rouge also targeted ethnic Vietnamese and other minorities in 
Cambodia in order to ensure that Democractic Kampuchea would be a pure Khmer 
nation.   As Karnaka Mak states, “the ethnic Vietnamese population was completely 
exterminated—it is estimated that 100% of the country’s remaining ethnic Vietnamese 
population… died between 1975-1979… [in addition], 40% of ethnic Lao, Thai, and 
Cham populations died.”120  For the Khmer Rouge, therefore, the purging of potential 
enemies had begun and was to continue in order to ensure the survival of the regime.  As 
Gottesman describes, “by May 1975, [Cambodia’s urban residents] had been dubbed 
‘new people’ or ‘April 17 people’ and had been escorted to the rural cooperatives that 
now controlled the whole of the Cambodian population.”121
For the millions of Cambodians under the Khmer Rouge, life in the cooperatives 
was depicted as a continuation of the war and struggle of the revolution.  As one Khmer 
Rouge informed the people, “we have won the revolution but the war still goes on…we 
warn you that it will not be easy.  We must maintain a mentality of struggling against all 
obstacles.  If Angka122 says to break rocks, break rocks.  If Angka says to dig canals, you 
must dig canals… only in this way can we liberate the country and liberate the people!”123
To fulfill the Khmer Rouge idea of a communist model for the country, the Khmer Rouge 
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abolished family life, individual life, and instituted a system of labor camp life.124  As 
Gottesman illustrates:
Cambodians, with the exceptions of Khmer Rouge cadres and soldiers, worked in 
the fields through the daylight hours and, in parts of the country, much longer.  
Cooperatives ate together.  Evenings, spent in the communal dining halls, were 
taken up with political education, self-criticism, and criticism of others.  Life was 
structured and regulated down to the smallest detail… the Khmer Rouge 
frequently separated men from women and organized mass forced marriages for 
single people as well as for the ever-increasing number of widows and widowers.  
Children often lived separately [from] their parents.125
In other words, the labor camps became a place where work and home were fused 
together.  According to official decree, the citizens of the new country of Democratic 
Kampuchea were “either peasants, workers, or soldiers… where the citizens were 
promised one right—the right to work.”126  Charged with the responsibilities to build the 
country’s economic and social self-sufficiency and self-reliance, peasants and workers 
were thus to build up an industrial base and expand the agricultural production.127  With 
economic plans like the Four Year Plan, the Khmer Rouge therefore sought to increase 
rice exports and move towards economic independence and prosperity.  For instance, in 
the northwest region of Cambodia, plans were to have “over 140,000 hectares of 
uncultivated or unproductive land … be brought under cultivation.  All in all, the 
northwest was scheduled to provide 60 percent of Cambodia’s rice experts between 1977 
and 1980.”128  As I show later, however, these economic plans often failed to achieve their 
goals, resulting in the increased paranoia of the Khmer Rouge that party enemies were 
working to undermine the Angka.  In the end, such paranoia and failed policies led to the 
purging of leaders within the Khmer Rouge.
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At the beginning of its regime, the Communist Party of Kampuchea leadership 
hid itself behind the ubiquitous name “Angka,” or “Organization,” in order to protect 
itself from party enemies and maintain secrecy.129  Enemies, indeed, had become 
synonymous with “either unnamed spies working for foreign agents, or those with enemy 
traits that would undermine the revolution—such as lust for private property, family 
virtues, or personal gain.  These were class enemies.”130  As Gottesman depicts, “the 
Khmer Rouge leadership remained invisible.  At a congress held on April 25, 1975, 
Sihanouk, who was still in China, was referred to as … head of state.  There was no 
mention of the Party or its ideology… the new rulers were identified only as angka.”131
By October 1975, however, the leadership emerged, assigned to eleven men and two 
women.  Chandler writes:
the ‘comrade secretary,’ Saloth Sar [Pol Pot], took charge of the economy and 
defense; the ‘comrade deputy secretary,’ Nuon Chea, was responsible for party 
organizational work and education; and Ieng Sary was to handle foreign affairs 
for the state and the party.  Khieu Samphan remained as liaison officer with the 
National Front—that is, with Sihanouk.  He was also given the tasks of ‘the 
accountancy and pricing aspects of commerce’…Koy Thuon took charge of 
domestic and foreign trade, while Son Sen was in command of security and the 
military General Staff.  Others … included Vorn Vet, in charge of industry, 
railways, and fisheries; Soeu Va Si, in charge of the Central Committee’s political 
office; Non Suon, in charge of the agriculture portfolio; and Chhim Samauk, in 
charge of the prime minister’s office… Ieng Sary’s wife, Khieu Thirith, received 
the social welfare portfolio; and Son Sen’s wife, Yun Yat, was in charge of 
culture, education, and propaganda.132
By 1977, the precautions that the leadership had taken to ensure its own security and 
secrecy failed to save Democratic Kampuchea from its self-inflicted downfall.  As the 
Khmer Rouge and their new Democratic Kampuchea failed to meet their unrealistic Four 
Year Plan and thus did not achieve the economic and social prosperity the Khmer Rouge 
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envisioned, the leadership began to take dramatic steps by purging its own leadership.  As 
Chandler writes, between 1976 and 1978, Pol Pot “saw to it that close to a third of his 
cabinet were executed over the next three years… some of those killed, like Chhim 
Samauk and Vorn Vet, had been his intimate associated for many years.”133  With the help 
of its S-21 interrogation center and indiscriminate targeting of over 14,000 men, women, 
and children “enemies,” Pol Pot therefore continued to uphold his idea that Democratic 
Kampuchea needed to be built and defended by eliminating its enemies.  In Pol Pot’s 
words, “enemies attack and torment us.  From the east and from the west, they persist in 
pounding us and worrying us.  If we are slow and weak, they will mistreat us.”134  As 
Chandler indicates, “perhaps as many as 100,000 people—a large proportion of them 
cadre, soldiers, and their families—were gathered up and put to death.”135  In the end, Pol 
Pot’s obsession with purifying the party and combating incessant enemies weakened his 
party, causing the Khmer Rouge to be unable to fight the Vietnamese in their first attack 
against Cambodia in 1977 and then finally with Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 
1979.
In other words, Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea, based on the goals of 
recapturing past glories experienced during Angkor times through racial homogeneity, 
collectivization, self-sufficiency, and independence from foreign nations, did not achieve 
its revolution but instead caused the genocide of over one fourth of Cambodia’s 
population.  Paranoid with the view that the party had to defend itself against its enemies, 
the Khmer Rouge tortured, killed, and destroyed Cambodia, its culture, its social 
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structures, and its people.  In the end, as I have shown, the Khmer Rouge were victims of 
their own unrealistic agenda and obsession.
VI.  Post-1979, No Justice for Cambodia
When Vietnam invaded Cambodia on January 7, 1979, and overthrew the Pol Pot 
regime, it installed in its place the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), which was 
“comprised in part of former Khmer Rouge cadres including Hun Sen, who had escaped 
internal purges by fleeing to Vietnam in 1977.  The PRK immediately proclaimed itself 
liberator of Cambodia.”136  For some in the international community, like the United 
States and China, the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam was seen as a violation of 
international law and thus illegitimate.  For others, like the Soviet Union, the Vietnamese 
were not invaders, as the PRK constituted of Cambodian defectors from the Khmer 
Rouge.  Although DK forces numbering over 30,000 men and women and 100,000 
villagers had retreated through the forests into northwestern Cambodia, the DK forces, 
with the assistance of foreign patronage and personal security, were able to rebuild their 
military strength and create an opposition to the PRK.137  Indeed, as a resolution passed by 
the United Nations in the 1980s shows, “Democratic Kampuchea, [under the Khmer 
Rouge], retained Cambodia’s seat in the United Nations… even as word of its atrocities 
became known internationally.  This sad development resulted from an effective anti-
Vietnam coalition led by China and ASEAN, and supported by the United States… as 
well as many Third World nations.”138  As I illustrate in the rest of this section, the period 
post-1979 was marked mainly by political instability and conflict, where the agenda for 
the Cambodian political parties and the international community became occupied with 
136
 George Chigas, “The politics of defining justice after the Cambodian genocide,” Journal of Genocide 
Research 2.2 (2000): 247.
137
 Chandler(1999) 157-159.
138
 Steven Ratner and Jason Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: 
Beyong the Nuremberg Legacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 239.
56
political ideology, power, and stability, rather than with seeking to establish transitional 
justice for Cambodia’s survivors.139
In the early 1980s, information concerning Pol Pot and his regime emerged, 
creating worldwide revulsion and non-communist Cambodian impatience with Vietnam’s 
prolonged occupation of Cambodia.  As a result of these pressures, the United States and 
its allies decided to “sponsor the formation of an anti-Vietnamese coalition government 
that could replace the Red Khmer delegation at the United Nations and provide a 
noncommunist coloring to the anti-Vietnamese resistance.”140  Again, the political agenda 
of both the international community and Cambodian parties in minimizing communist 
control of Cambodia by the Vietnamese and consolidating political power superseded the 
needs of acknowledging Cambodian survivors’ suffering and trauma during the Pol Pot 
era.  As Chandler describes, “the coalition government was formed in the middle of 1982.  
It was dominated by DK officials because of Democratic Kampuchea’s patrons and 
military prowess; the other two factions were led by Prince Sihanouk… and by a pre-
Revolutionary prime minister, Son Sann, who had lived for many years in France.”141  As 
fighting between the DK-led coalition government and the Vietnamese forces took place, 
“most Cambodians over twenty were terrified that Pol Pot would return to power.”142
Indeed, when the Vietnamese forces withdrew from Cambodia in 1989, the Khmer Rouge 
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forces “had built up an impressive portfolio of foreign investments… valued at over $100 
million, making the faction financially independent.”143
To diminish the power of the Khmer Rouge and seek a political balance between 
the four factional Cambodian political parties, the international community organized 
conferences between 1987 and 1990.  According to Chandler, “pressures mounted on the 
four Cambodian factions to reach some kind of agreement… the state of Cambodia, as 
the regime in the Phnom Penh now called itself, had to abandon its demonization of the 
DK regime… and relinquish some of its national sovereignty to the United Nations.”144
In 1993, the United Nations assembled the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) in an effort to supervise “the disarming of factions, the resettlement 
of refugees, and the preparations for national elections.”145  Suspicious, Pol Pot and his 
leadership saw UNTAC and participation in the peace process as a ruse intended to 
incapacitate their movement.  As a result, rather than participate in the elections, “the 
Khmer Rouge boycotted the UN-organized 1993 elections, and kept killing Cambodian 
troops and civilians.”146  As Chandler stipulates, “perhaps the leadership hoped that these 
massacres would set off a wave of anti-Vietnamese violence, just as they hoped that they 
boycott of the UN-sponsored elections would produce massive absenteeism among 
Cambodian voters.”147  After the May 1993 elections, a coalition government was formed 
by Prince Norodom Ranariddh’s FUNCINPEC party (which had won the elections) and 
Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) (which had governed the country since 
1979).148
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Gottesman describes the political situation in Cambodia after the 1993 elections 
as follows:
pluralism in Cambodia did not evolve into a democratic exchange of ideas [as the 
international community had hoped] but into a tenuous compact among 
competing patronage systems.  Most FUNCINPEC officials were more concerned 
with satisfying their superiors than with changing the way the country was 
governed.  A notable exception was Finance Minister Sam Rainsy, whose 
complaints about unaccountable timber deals and other forms of corruption 
incurred the anger of Hun Sen.  Rainsy’s actions also annoyed Rannariddh, who 
removed him from office in October 1994… the lesson was clear.  Hun Sen and 
the CPP leadership could tolerate the multiparty system imposed on them by the 
international community so long as the other parties did not directly challenge 
their interests.149
For Hun Sen, therefore, the 1993 elections had been a means by which to gain 
international legitimacy in order to enhance his political power.  The task now was to 
regain his domination in the political scene, manipulating Cambodia’s institutions and 
political alliances to his advantage.150  As Chigas demonstrates, Hun Sen played his 
political cards by seeking to dismantle the Khmer Rouge and undermine such a threat by 
assimilating defecting forces into the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF).151  To 
this effect, in 1994, the Phnom Penh authorities declared the Khmer Rouge “illegal and 
resumed military operations against them.”152  From this point on, the Khmer Rouge 
movement began to come apart, lacking foreign support and legitimacy, while Hun Sen 
advanced his political agenda rather than pay attention to the needs of Cambodia’s 
survivors.  As Chigas attests, “by passing the 1994 law, the Hun Sen government was not 
concerned with making the Khmer Rouge leadership accountable for the crimes 
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committed between 1975 and 1979.  Instead, it was using the resources at its command to 
bring about the final downfall of its longstanding enemy.”153
Starting in 1994, the United States began to change its approach towards 
Cambodia, aiming to reasserts its role as the champion of human rights and rule of law in 
Cambodia.  Moreover, the international donor community saw a trial in Cambodia as a 
way to assess the effectiveness and reliability of Cambodia’s legal and economic 
institutions that were being administered with their aid programs.154  In 1994, the U.S. 
Congress passed a legislation with the goal of bringing the Khmer Rouge leadership to 
justice.  On the other hand, Hun Sen continued to pursue his goal of achieving political 
security, framing the issue of justice around national reconciliation, peace, and stability, 
rather than disruptive legal proceedings against the Khmer Rouge.155  In effect, when Ieng 
Sary defected from his position as Khmer Rouge Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Hun Sen gave Sary amnesty.  In July 1997, Hun Sen realized his political power 
as he led a coup d’état against Prince Rannaridh.
In other words, this section has enumerated the different political decisions taken 
by both the international community and the Cambodian political parties that demonstrate 
the absence of justice for Cambodia’s survivors post-1979 and the encapsulation of both 
entities into achieving their own political agendas.  As Kiernan depicts, “twenty years of 
UN silence on Khmer Rouge genocide encouraged Cambodians to ignore the past.”156  As 
the international community was engulfed in disagreements over political ideology 
during the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, the United Nations continued to 
recognize the Khmer Rouge.  With Hun Sen, his determination of gaining political power 
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and stability led to his integration of Khmer Rouge defectors into his political party and 
denial of justice and acknowledgment to Cambodia’s survivors.  Hence, post-1979 era ws 
marked by political preoccupation rather than justice, truth, and acknowledgment of 
Cambodia’s survivors.  And as I show in the next section, although discussions around 
transitional justice emerged beginning in 1994, the issue of justice for Cambodia’s 
survivors has today again turned into political grounds for the United Nations and the 
Cambodian government to assert their legitimacy.  
VII. Progress for Justice: The Creation of a Khmer Rouge Tribunal
Although one could argue that judicial redress against the Khmer Rouge took 
place under the PRK government in 1979, the method of such processes can hardly be 
characterized as seeking to achieve the goals of transitional justice.  As I mentioned in 
chapter two, transitional justice is about acknowledging and confronting a country’s past, 
usually marked by mass atrocities, by restoring an understanding of truth, reconciliation, 
memory, history, and humanity focused on the experiences of the victims in order for a 
society to move forward.  Like Luftglass, therefore, I agree that trying Khmer Rouge 
leaders in absentia, without representation, and on the presumption of guilt rather than 
innocence was more a matter of political interest than justice.  As I indicated in the 
previous section, discussions around establishing a tribunal to try the Khmer Rouge 
finally began to take shape in 1994 when Senator Robb and Representative Solarz 
worked to encourage, support, establish, and finance a tribunal to prosecute the leaders of 
the Khmer Rouge regime.  Today, more than eleven years after this initial resolution, the 
Khmer Rouge tribunal is still not fully set up.  As with the period post-1979, I even argue 
that the current processes of creating a Khmer Rouge tribunal has continued to be 
dominated by political agendas on the part of both the Cambodian Hun Sen Government 
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and the United Nations.  In this section, therefore, I analyze the events and discussions 
that have surrounded the creation of the Khmer Rouge tribunal, all the while pointing out 
how victims have often been kept outside of the deliberations meant to bring them 
justice, dignity, acknowledgment, and memory.
In 1994, President Clinton made it a priority to bring justice to Cambodians for 
the crimes against humanity committed by the Khmer Rouge.  In December 1994, with 
funding from the U.S. government, Yale University launched the Cambodian Genocide 
Program, whose task was to uncover secret DK documents.  Overall, more than 100,000 
documents were found, providing evidence of testimonies conducted at the Tuol Sleng 
prison, DK official meetings, reports from the CPK zones, and notebooks of senior CPK 
officials.157  In addition, the United Nations also began to revisit the issue of 
accountability for CPK crimes as a result of efforts by Ambassador Thomas 
Hammarberg.  “In April 1997, his efforts resulted in a resolution by the UN Commission 
on Human Rights calling upon the UN Secretary-General to ‘examine any request by 
Cambodia for assistance in responding to past serious violations of Cambodian and 
international law.”158  As Luftglass portrays, however, the role of the United Nations was 
limited as a result of the neglect and absence of timely intervention by the international 
community to prevent or punish Khmer Rouge atrocities.  In other words, the active 
participation of the United Nations to bring about a tribunal was seen as suspicious and 
“motivated by collective guilt, rather than the best interests of Cambodia.”159  For the 
establishment of a tribunal for the Khmer Rouge, therefore, the significance of such 
perceptions meant that the international community had lost legitimacy and right to make 
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overarching demands on the Cambodian government with regards to a tribunal, because it 
had failed to do so when given the opportunity post-1979.160
In 1995, then-Second Prime Minister Hun Sen stated at a conference that the 
notion of a tribunal for the Khmer Rouge was necessary, not on the ground of politics but 
of justice for Cambodia’s survivors.161  A few years later on June 21, 1997, Cambodia 
began to actively seek help from the international community.  Then-First Prime Minister 
Norodom Ranarridh and then-Second Prime Minister Hun Sen submitted a request to the 
UN Secretary-General to assist Cambodia in “bringing to justice those persons 
responsible for the genocide and crimes against humanity during the rule of the Khmer 
Rouge from 1975 and 1979.”162  Although the request seemed to imply the invitation of 
the international community to organize a UN-sponsored and controlled tribunal by 
mentioning similar assistance to be given to Cambodia as was done with Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, the request did not “necessarily embody its true intentions,” which were those 
of establishing a tribunal based on the rules and leadership of the Cambodian 
government.163
Following the Cambodian request, the UN General Assembly adopted a 
resolution in December 1997 asking Kofi Annan to establish a commission to investigate 
how a tribunal could take place.  In response, Kofi Annan established a Group of Experts, 
whose three main goals were: 1) to evaluate the existing evidence and determine the 
nature of the crimes committed; 2) to assess the feasibility of bringing Khmer Rouge 
leaders to justice; and 3) to explore options for trials before international or domestic 
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courts.164  Between July 1998 and February 1999, the Group of Experts “traveled through 
Cambodia interviewing government officials, survivors of the Khmer Rouge regime, and 
current Cambodian citizens, hoping not only to obtain information regarding the 
atrocities, but also to assess the emotional climate of the country.”165  In the end, a sixty-
page report was produced, with recommendations stating that the Khmer Rouge leaders 
should be tried for crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, forced 
labor, torture, and crimes against internationally protected persons.  Moreover, the report 
recommended that the prosecutions be limited to the Khmer Rouge main leaders or 
officials directly implicated in the most serious atrocities, and that an ad hoc UN tribunal 
be set up in an Asia-Pacific nation-state other than Cambodia along the same lines as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.166  It is important to note also 
the Group of Experts’ emphasis on the tribunal taking place with an international 
character, in order to ensure that international standards of justice, fairness, and the 
process of law be met.167
When the Cambodian Government under Hun Sen received notice of the report by 
the Group of Experts, it denounced the conclusions and rejected the recommendations.168
Instead, the Cambodian Government’s position was that “the international community 
ought only to provide legal expertise”169 and that the issues of national reconciliation and 
political stability should be taken into account in efforts to bring about justice.  For Hun 
Sen, therefore, the issue of transitional justice signified an opportunity to assert his 
government’s sovereignty and credibility in the eyes of the Cambodian people and 
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international community.  Rather than establish an international tribunal, Hun Sen 
insisted that creating a domestic trial with international participation be followed.  In 
December 1999, Hun Sen’s Government, with the assistance of the United States, 
“agreed on a Draft Memorandum of Understanding, with a  modern definition of 
genocide and a domestic tribunal with ‘supermajority’ requirements: a majority of 
Cambodian judges… but requiring the assent of one international judge on all 
decision.”170  In response, many believed that such a proposal was “designed to allow Hun 
Sen allowed too much political leeway for Hun Sen as to who would be indicted, who 
would be convicted, and what crimes the defendants would be found to have committed.  
In particular, some held that the draft included provisions that could have facilitated 
substantial political influence over prosecution and judgment.”171  Hoping for Cambodia 
to acknowledge the benefits of a more internationally-controlled process, the UN 
continued its negotiations with the Hun Sen Government.172
To the surprise of the international community, the Cambodian Government 
passed legislation on August 10, 2001, establishing the “Extraordinary Chambers, which 
passed through the Cambodian National Assembly (86-2) and Senate (51-0).”173  As 
Luftglass describes,
the Extraordinary Chambers not only represent a significant departure from the 
ongoing negotiations, but they also serve as a preview of the presently agreed-
upon mixed tribunal, which is almost identically structure.  The Chambers… 
would have subject matter jurisdiction over a wide range of human rights 
offenses.  The structure of the Chambers included a trial court with three 
Cambodian and two foreign judges, an appeals court with four Cambodian and 
three foreign judges, and a supreme court with five Cambodian and four foreign 
judges.174
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Feeling betrayed and frustrated over the unexpected processes of justice taking place in 
Cambodia, Kofi Annan terminated UN involvement in Cambodia in February 2002.  
Indeed, the deadlock proceeded until June 2002, “when Hun Sen called and twice wrote 
the Secretary-General requesting UN assistance.”175  Although Kofi Annan could have 
long withdrawn UN assistance in Cambodia, as was advocated by his Office of Legal 
Affairs, Annan kept alive his commitment to the tribunal for he felt that he and the UN 
“had something to prove after the UN’s debacles in Rwanda and the Balkans.  The 
Secretary-General has publicly commented many times about the UN’s failure to protect 
the people of Rwanda in 1994, and has vowed that the UN will improve its performance 
on issues pertaining to genocide for the remainder of his tenure.”176  Hence, in November 
2002, the UN resumed negotiations with Cambodia.  In March 2003, the UN and 
Cambodian Government finally reached an agreement, known as the March Agreement.  
According to Luftglass:
the tribunal will be seated in Cambodia, most likely Phnom Penh, with Khmer as 
the official language.  The Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia governs both the subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction of the agreed-upon tribunal.  The tribunal procedures will 
follow Cambodian law, with the March Agreement stipulating that where there is 
uncertainty regarding Cambodian law, the tribunal may turn to international law.  
Consequently, domestic norms, rather than international precedents shall govern 
the procedural law followed by both Cambodian and international judges… the 
March Agreement does address several issues that other Cambodian proposals 
previously ignored.  First, the March Agreement mandates that the Cambodian 
Government will not grant any additional amnesties or pardons to the Khmer 
Rouge.  Second, regarding the prior pardon of Ieng Sary, the March Agreement 
indicates that the Extraordinary Chambers will have the exclusive authority to 
determine whether the scope of the pardon precludes potential prosecution.  
Third, the March Agreement requires adherence to the due process provisions of 
Articles 14 and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.177
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The March Agreement, therefore, has come to embody the possibility of disrupting the 
culture of impunity that has pervaded Cambodian society since 1979.  With the 
jurisdiction to try cases of genocide and crimes against humanity, the Extraordinary 
Chambers have thus been seen by scholars like Susan Cook as providing the impetus for 
acknowledgment, justice, truth, memory, and dignity to be achieved.178  As delays and 
political infighting have shown, however, the issues of genocide politics and legitimacy 
continue to embroil the dynamics of creating the Khmer Rouge tribunal. 
Today, questions and criticisms over the creation of the Khmer Rouge tribunal 
have arisen over: 1) the efficiency of the Cambodian judicial system given its notoriously 
corrupt judiciary to handle the magnitude of crimes against humanity and genocide 
involved during the Khmer Rouge era; 2) whether the incentives for the Hun Sen 
Government to pursue transitional justice are propelled by politics or genuine interest to 
see justice; 3) the lack of participation of victims in the tribunal processes; 4) whether a 
Khmer Rouge tribunal will exacerbate political tensions in Cambodia and negatively 
diverge needed attention to Cambodia’s social and economic infrastructures; and 5) the 
absence of accountability towards lower-ranking Khmer Rouge leaders involved in 
committing serious crimes.179
In 2004, political infighting within Cambodia resulted in an 11-month political 
stalemate that engendered pessimism and fear over Cambodia’s commitment to see 
justice realized for Cambodia’s survivors.180  In addition, the Justice Initiative voiced 
concern over the procedural ambiguities involved in the establishment of the tribunal, 
stating that “the precise standards by which international and Cambodian judges, 
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prosecutors and other court staff are selected and appointed… are currently unclear … 
[moreover], “no codes of ethics regulating the conduct of judges and other staff of the 
Extraordinary Champers currently exist.”181  As post-conflict expert Nathaniel Myers also 
describes, the Hun Sen Government has played an active role in forestalling Khmer 
Rouge tribunal efforts.  For instance, when the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
announced that its “member states now covered the UN’s $43 million share of the 
tribunal’s $56.3 million budget… the Royal Government of Cambodia unexpectedly 
announced that it could not cover most of its own share [showing] the little progress [that 
had] been made in the months since.”182  Moreover, Etcheson asserts that Hun Sen has 
been more interested in managing political balance by seeking to satisfy everyone’s 
interests.  As he writes:
Hun Sen has a tendency to tell everyone what thy want to hear, and then he 
wobbles a bit to keep everyone off balance and continuing to beat a path to his 
door with additional inducements… Cambodia is following the “Two Victories” 
policy, which is to forget the past and concentrate only on the future, [while 
arguing] that the Cambodian people deserve justice for the crimes of the Khmer 
Rouge regime.183
Finally, although the notion of justice for Cambodia has been voiced around the needs for 
redress for the victims, current transitional justice processes have lacked the input and 
participation of Cambodia’s survivors in the creation of the tribunal.  Where the goals of 
transitional justice should be about “coexistence, trust, and empathy between individuals 
who are connected as victims, beneficiaries, and perpetrators… the individual victims 
and perpetrators are at the heart of [transitional justice] activities,”184 Cambodian voices 
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from civil society and the victims and survivors has been ignored in the process of setting 
up the tribunal.  As Cambodian participants mentioned at an Asia Society conference, 
“the negotiations that took place between the Cambodian Government and UN since 
March 1999 were dominated by agendas of Cambodian officials and foreigners.  Public 
opinion and the view of Cambodian NGOs did not figure prominently into the debate on 
how the tribunal should be structured.”185  In other words, rather than abide by its 
commitment to transitional justice with a victim-centered focus, the Cambodian 
Government and international community have taken an impasse that has been shaped by 
politics and notions of legitimacy and power.
To conclude, this section has aimed at describing the background processes that 
have contributed to the dynamics of a Khmer Rouge tribunal today.  Marked by erratic 
discussions shaped by political interests, both the international community under the 
auspices of the United Nations and the Cambodian Government finally came to an 
agreement in March 2003 to establish the Extraordinary Chambers for the Prosecution of 
Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea.  Using the notions of 
justice for the victims and survivors advocated for by the international community and 
the Hun Sen Government, I hold that the task today for the Cambodian Government and 
the United Nations is to acknowledge the political turn that the procedures have followed, 
and in doing so, to display their commitment to transitional justice by adopting a more 
victim-centered approach.  By describing the criticisms that have arisen from civil and 
political entities, I have also shown the limitations and flaws that need to be taken into 
account in order to ensure that transitional justice is indeed achieved.  In the next section, 
I provide a model for how a more victim-centered approach of transitional justice can 
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take place in Cambodia, given the experiences and lessons that can be learned and 
adapted from the transitional justice procedures in South Africa, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
and East Timor.
Chapter Four
Transitional Justice
“Certainly, very few people have made any effort to consult the Cambodian 
people about whether this tribunal will appease their need for truth and justice in 
regard to the Khmer Rouge regime, or whether this is no longer a concern for 
them over 20 years following the demise of the Regime.”
--Chea Vannath, Center for Social Development186
“Following a major breakdown of the rule of law and basic civic values, a society 
must reconstruct its moral underpinnings.  Truth commissions can be a part, 
perhaps the cornerstone, of such a process of moral reconstruction.”
--José Zalaquett, University of Chile187
“Criminal justice is an essential part of an integrated response to massive human 
rights violations, and should be pursued whenever possible.  While prosecutions 
must necessarily focus on the accused, these efforts should also aim to restore 
victims’ dignity and public confidence in the rule of law.”
--International Center for Transitional Justice, 2005188
I.  Introduction
As I have mentioned in the previous chapters, the goal of achieving transitional 
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justice in Cambodia has been symbolized by the visions of reclaiming the victims’ 
dignities, acknowledging Cambodia’s painful past, finally bringing justice to Cambodia’s 
survivors and their families, and creating possibilities for reconciliation and justice so 
that Cambodia can move forward as an emerging democracy.  By examining the current 
processes of creating the Khmer Rouge tribunal, however, I have demonstrated the 
political dimensions, both domestic and international, that have come to constrain and 
move Cambodia away from realizing these prospects.  Indeed, evidence of delays in 
financing the tribunal, political infighting within Cambodia’s parliament, and ambiguities 
in Prime Minister Hun Sen’s statements concerning the tribunal, has only served to 
validate Cambodians’ fears that current dynamics of transitional justice may in the end 
only be a political show.
In this chapter, therefore, I provide an analysis of how a more victim-centered 
approach, one aimed at providing an active role to the victims in the processes of 
transitional justice and at ensuring that such processes focus on acknowledging the 
victims’ dignity, humanity, need for justice, healing, and recovery, can be re-
conceptualized for Cambodia.  To do this, I first move away from the premise that the 
means of reckoning with past human rights abuses are only possible through two possible 
responses—trials and punishment or forgetting the past.189  Instead, I hold that if one is to 
look at the global situation of transitional justice, one would realize the many non-judicial 
mechanisms, such as truth and reconciliation commissions, amnesty programs, public 
deliberation avenues, and culturally based solutions, that have been employed 
complementary to tribunals to reckon with past wrongs.  In the rest of this chapter, hence, 
I will 1) provide an overview of the transitional justice processes that have taken place in 
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South Africa, Rwanda, East Timor, and Sierra Leone, and look at how victim-based 
approaches were or were not implemented in these situations and what the impacts of
these transitional justice procedures were; 2) look at the different suggestions that have 
been made by scholars and activists to bring about a more victim-based approach for 
Cambodia; and 3) propose the victim-centered model that I envision for Cambodia given 
these varying examples, proposals, and suggestions.
II.  Transitional Justice in Application: Case Studies
The cases of South Africa, Rwanda, East Timor, and Sierra Leone give insights 
into how contemporary societies have dealt with their pasts of mass atrocities and the 
challenges that they have faced at ensuring the goals of justice, redress, memory, and 
healing.  Whereas some of these countries pursued judicial, retributive avenues to redress 
past wrongs, others implemented non-prosecutorial mechanisms such as truth 
commissions or culturally based practices like the gacaca to reckon with their societies’ 
past wrongs.  By examining these approaches, I subscribe to David Bloomfield’s 
understanding of transitional justice, which is that “there is no ‘right answer’ to the 
[transitional justice], and so we [should not] try to prescribe a one-size-fits-all solution.  
Instead, we [should] present the tools, with their strengths and weaknesses: they are to be 
adopted and adapted, changed or replaced, as they suit the specific context.”190  In other 
words, by looking at these four case studies, it is my aim to point out the mechanisms that 
have underscored the potential for victims of mass atrocities to participate in the 
processes of transitional justice, in order to move forward.  
A.  South Africa 
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Between 1948 and 1990, South Africa followed a rigid, legalized policy of racial 
segregation known as apartheid.  Led by the National Party, which was in large 
comprised of white Afrikaners, South Africa legislated specific laws and regulations to 
enforce such an order.  John Dugard describes:
The apartheid order was a legal order.  Most of the injustices perpetrated by 
successive apartheid governments between 1948 and 1990 were committed in the 
name of the law.  Millions were deprived of their South African citizenship… 
millions were arrested and imprisoned for violating influx control laws which 
required Africans to produce identity documents … and millions were forcibly 
relocated in order to achieve territorial and residential segregation.  Thousands 
were detained without trial under arbitrary security laws and imprisoned for 
opposing apartheid… the entire population was characterized under racial lines 
and racial ‘purity’… those classified as ‘nonwhite’ were denied the franchise and 
given inferior education, health care, social welfare benefits, and housing.191
For the South African Government, moreover, anyone who resisted apartheid was 
considered a state enemy and was to be destroyed.  Acting with the blessing of the 
Afrikaner authorities, officers of the apartheid regime often acted outside the law to 
terminate such dissension.  As Dugard further writes, “in the last years of apartheid, 
many were killed by members of a mysterious agency known as the ‘Third Force,’ 
generally believed to have been members of the security forces charged with the task of 
destroying the [pro-African rights] African National Congress (ANC).”192
After years of protests and international sanctions, South Africa’s apartheid was 
finally brought to an end constitutionally under Act 200 of 1993.193  Soon after, Nelson 
Mandela, a nearly-three-decades prisoner, was elected as the new South Africa’s first 
president.  “Parliament was established, and [Mandela] appointed (in 1995) the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, or TRC, [to be presided by Archbishop Desmond Tutu] to 
191
“Law and the South African Model,” Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in New 
Democracies, ed. James McAdams (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997) P?.
192
 Ibid 271.
193
 Ibid 273.
73
discover the dark facts of apartheid, and to report them to South Africa and the world.”194
For South Africa, the policy for transitional justice became one of reconciliation and 
understanding rather than one of revenge and punishment as had been embodied by 
previous transitional justice mechanisms like the Nuremberg Trials.  David Crocker 
describes:
While recognizing that a country must reckon with its past evils rather than adopt 
‘National Amnesia,’ Tutu nevertheless [rejected] what he call[ed] the ‘Nuremberg Trial 
paradigm’…[instead], he believe[d] that victims should not press charges against those 
who violated their rights and the state should not make the accused ‘run the gauntlet of 
the normal judicial process’ and impose punishment on those found guilty.  In the spirit 
of ubuntu, the central concern [should thus be about] the healing of breaches, the 
redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships, a seeking to rehabilitate 
both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be 
reintegrated into the community that he has injured by his offense.195
With the 1995 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, 
therefore, the law identified the goals of reconciliation, conditional amnesty, reparation, 
and the search for truth as the means for South Africa to move forward as a new 
democracy.  In doing so, the Act provided for “the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of seventeen members, appointed by the President in consultation with the 
Cabinet, to establish a complete picture of the ‘gross violations of human rights’ 
committed between March 1960 (the time of the massacre at Sharpeville) and 1993.”196
In addition, the Act considered the possibilities for granting amnesty to perpetrators in 
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order to forge a successful multiracial society and encourage perpetrators to come 
forward and testify to uncover apartheid at its worst.197  To receive amnesty, the 
conditions that applicants needed to satisfy were: 1) having committed an act that 
constitutes ‘a gross violation of human rights’; and 2) fully disclosing all relevant facts, 
especially ones that demonstrated that a political objective was involved in the act.198
According to the Committee on Amnesty, the gross violations of human rights were 
confined to “the killing, abduction, torture, or severe ill-treatment of any person.”199  For 
those who failed to apply for amnesty or failed to fully disclose the facts, amnesty could 
be denied and prosecution could take place in domestic courts.200  For South Africa, 
therefore, the process of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was to be centered on 
the victims with the aims of reclaiming the victims’ dignity through truth, 
acknowledgment, public deliberation, collective understanding, and reparation.  As 
Rotberg writes, the sense was therefore “that a society can move forward only after it 
comes to terms with its collective angst [and] that meant dealing with outrages committed 
by whites against Africans, Africans against Africans, Africans against whites, and the 
African National Congress (ANC) against its own members.”201
In the end, South Africa’s TRC achieved many of its goals of recovering truth and 
bringing acknowledgment and closure to the victims and their families.  For one, the TRC 
processes served the needs of a deliberative democracy by involving an array of actors 
and participants, and most particularly, the victims and their families.  As Rotberg 
comments, “civil society played a large role in composing the commission and its 
mandate; Parliament, not a president or prime minister, authorized the TRC.  Its striking 
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structure and many goals were mandated by an act of Parliament.”202  In addition, André 
du Toit suggested that the South African model of TRC passed moral tests because it held 
victims’ hearings as the central focus of the procedures.  Because of the TRC’s truth-
telling opportunities, the processes encouraged catharsis and therapy for the victims and 
their families to occur.203  In South Africa, the TRC “broke the deathly silence 
surrounding the grotesque consequences of the apartheid system.  The new nation and 
thousands of individuals achieved an important catharsis.”204  As Henry Steiner notes, the 
TRC in South Africa afforded the possibilities for “reconciliation among different 
groups… vindication of victims as their stories [were] officially and publicly heard and 
recorded, the satisfaction of a larger sense of justice through official acknowledgment 
and condemnation of what [had] occurred, forgiveness by victims of the perpetrators.”205
To this end, Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela depicts:
Stories of forgiveness from victims of human rights abuses, like that of Amy 
Biehl’s parents, Peter and Linda Biehl, are significant not only because they mark 
some of the most memorable moments and moral achievements in the life of the 
TRC hearings, but also, even more important, because they translate the 
forgiveness model from high-minded homily to actual practice… when 
perpetrators express remorse, when they finally acknowledge that they can see 
what they previously could not see, or did not want to, they are revalidating the 
victim’s pain—in a sense, giving his or her humanity back. 206
But although these positive results took place, it is also important to point out that 
not all victims’ needs were addressed, and for some, South Africa’s policies of amnesty 
and lack of retributive justice through the courts were viewed as a major omission.  By 
seeing the TRC as the second-best option for South Africa given the political realities of 
the country and the need to forge a reconciled multiracial society, South Africa was 
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viewed as having failed to see the potential rewards that prosecutorial justice could bring 
to South Africa’s victims.  As Dugard demonstrates, “reconciliation serves the broad 
interests of society and state.  But it is not clear that it takes adequate account of the 
interests of the victims of apartheid.  This explains why the families of Steve Biko, 
Griffiths and Victoria Mxenge, and others challenged the constitutionality of amnesty… 
in May 1996.”207  As José Zalaquett also attests, “in many cases of transition to 
democracy, holding some exemplary trials may play a useful role even if full justice is 
impossible.  Such trials remind people of the moral values at stake.”208
In other words, the lesson to be learned from the case of South Africa is the 
positive impacts that public deliberation and involvement of a wide array of participants, 
especially the victims and their families, can have on a society seeking to move forward 
and to acknowledge the dignity and humanity of its survivors.  To keep in mind, 
however, is the importance of not discarding other mechanisms such as trials if such 
means can be implemented in conjunction given the political realities of the society in 
question.  
B.  Rwanda
In the spring and summer of 1994, ethnic tensions between Hutus and Tutsis that 
had been exacerbated by Belgian colonial interventions and that continued after 
Rwanda’s independence in 1960 erupted in the genocidal killings of more than 800,000 
people, mainly Tutsis, by the majority Hutu ethnic group.209  Before the 1994 genocide, 
power struggles between Hutus and Tutsis were common in the political scene.  In the 
early 1990s, then-Hutu President of Rwanda, Juvénal Habyarimana, had announced the 
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need to establish a sharing of power among ethnic groups and political parties.210  When 
President of Rwanda, along with the leader of Burundi, died in a plane crash on April 6, 
1994, however, plans for peace and power-sharing were dissolved.  Instead, the Hutu 
government charged that Tutsi forces had shot down the plane, and as a result, ethnic 
violence against Tutsis ensued.  Payam Akhavan illustrates the horrors of Rwanda as 
follows:
In Rwanda, the exceptional efficiency of violence allowed the extermination of 10 
to 15 percent of the population during a three-month period, and culminated a 
process involving the complicated planning and expenditure of resources.  The 
Rwanda conflict was not a spontaneous outburst of savagery.  Radio-Télévision 
Libre des Milles Collines and other media organized the extermination of the 
Tutsi and Hutu moderates through the systematic incitement of the public, 
targeting a largely illiterate population with no access to other sources of 
information… only when the Rwandese people were saturated with racist hatred 
and fallacies, and extremists had positioned themselves in every corner of the 
country, did it become possible to execute the monstrous ‘final solution.’211
For three months, Rwanda’s genocidal programs freely took place with the rest of 
the world quietly standing by and international peacekeeping forces unable to use force to 
prevent the mass killings of Tutsis.  As Mark Drumbl notes, “the Rwandan Patriotic 
Army, [or the armed forces of the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front political party], was the 
only entity that actively sought to stop the genocide.”212  By July 1994, though, the Tutsi-
led RPA succeeded in ousting the Hutu-led militant regime.  Since then, a new regime 
with Tutsi-dominated RPF has remained in power in Rwanda.213
Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the RPF government “pledged to bring to 
justice all those who had participated in the genocidal violence and detained large 
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numbers of suspects.”214  For the international community, the policy of justice for 
Rwanda’s survivors was to be one focused on punishment and prevention through the 
application of the rule of international law.  To this effect, the United Nations Security 
Council passed Resolution 955 on November 8, 1994, to establish the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) whose jurisdiction and prosecution were to be 
limited to high-ranking officers and to events that took place in 1994.  As Ratner and 
Abrams write, the ICTR’s organization [was] identical to that of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia “with separate prosecutorial, adjudicative, 
and administrative organs… several considerations motivated the decision to link the 
Rwanda Tribunal so closely to its Yugoslavia counterpart.  The sharing of common 
institutions and rules [was] aimed at promoting consistency in the law.”215   In 
accordance, the new Rwandan Government maintained that it would try all other 
defenders.216  For both levels of national and international trials, the goals embodied were 
to punish the guilty, to deter future acts of genocide, to bring about national 
reconciliation, to bring justice for the victims, to condemn evil, and to maintain peace.217
In other words, by following an accountability system through the courts, the 
international community and Rwandan government saw as central the needs for redress, 
reconciliation, and reclaiming of dignity for the victims.  According to Bronwyn Leebaw, 
trials, as tools of prosecutorial justice, have worked with the premise that “justice and 
conflict resolution should be understood and pursued as mutually reinforcing goals.”218
As Diane Orentlicher further indicates, the prosecutorial approach contributes to the 
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peace process, first with its very formality of prosecution that demonstrates that no sector 
is above the law, and second, with its unbiased and impartial aspects that put an end to 
impunity and contributes to the processes of reconciliation.219
In the end though, I hold that the results of the ICTR and the Rwandan trials 
failed to resonate well with the initial goals of seeking justice for the victims.  Certainly, 
the ICTR and Rwandan trials had some positive impacts that included preventing the rise 
of anti-Hutu vengeance killings, punishing the perpetrators, prosecuting some of the top 
officials involved in the genocide, and raising awareness about the Rwandan genocide in 
the global community.  As Akhavan indicates to this effect, “the ICTR as made its 
obvious contributions by politically incapacitating the remnants of the Hutu extremist 
leadership responsible for the 1994 genocide… this is the result of the arrests as well as 
the stigmatization of those associated with the previous government.”220  In addition, 
Drumbl notes that the domestic trials in Rwanda have been effective at the deontological 
goal of punishing.221  Nonetheless, though, the ICTR and the Rwandan trials had their fair 
share of drawbacks, the most important of which were the ICTR’s lack of participation 
and involvement of the victims and their families and the Rwandan trials’ failure to create 
a sense of individual responsibility among the perpetrators.
For one, the ICTR was created outside of the context of Rwanda by the 
international community following a model of international law that did not take into 
account Rwanda’s local realities.  As Drumbl writes, “the end result is a one-size-fits-all 
response that—particularly if externally imposed on a post-conflict society by foreign 
judges and magistrates—may relegate to a subordinate status the specific contextual 
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characteristics or needs of that society.”222  Second, the ICTR’s processes took place 
outside of Rwanda, and therefore, failed to achieve a sense of connection between the 
victims and the prosecutorial developments of the ICTR.  Akhavan attests to this effect 
that “the ICTR has often been faulted for its remoteness from the Rwandanese people.  Its 
geographical location in Arusha, Tanzania, makes it visibly distant.”223  Moreover, Leslie 
Vinjamuri and Jack Snyder concur, stating that “the international tribunal’s vision of 
justice has been scarcely visible within Rwanda and has made no contribution to national 
reconciliation.”224  On the issue of the Rwandan trials, moreover, Drumbl writes that “as a 
general rule, the trials, or the prospect of facing trial, have failed to produce shame, 
contrition, regret, or remorse among the prisoners… victims, too, are frustrated with the 
due process and exacting proofs.”225  In other words, rather than achieve the intended 
goals of empowering the victims and the reclaiming of their humanity through the 
processes of prosecutorial justice, trials, both in the ICTR and Rwandan national courts, 
have instead led the victims to feel alienated and to see justice as having failed to give 
them redress and acknowledgment.  In light of these concerns, however, the Rwandan 
Government took active steps in October 2000 to reform its transitional justice approach 
by giving rise to local participatory justice tribunals, called gacaca, in order to re-
contextualize justice for the victims and their local realities.
For the Rwandan Government, the use of gacaca, which is a practice that “dates 
back to pre-colonial Rwanda… and whose objective [has been] to restore harmony and 
social order,”226 to deal with the crimes against humanity and of genocide committed in 
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1994 has aimed at following a form of restorative justice centered around the needs of the 
victims.  As Leebaw suggests, the theory of restorative justice rests on four general 
principles: 1) restorative justice should be responsive to the context of the crime; 2) 
restorative justice promotes ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘reintegration’ of perpetrators; 3) 
restorative justice requires a concrete response to the needs of victims; and 4) restorative 
justice requires and dialogue that address the elements that contributed to the rise of 
crime and violence in the first place.227  The gacaca tribunals, therefore, are composed of 
elders and inyangamugayo, or people of integrity, to preside over the local tribunals.  
According to Drumbl, “two-hundred-and-sixty thousand such individuals were chosen in 
October 2001.”228  According to the procedure framework of the legislation, the 
procedures of the gacaca tribunals take place by bringing the perpetrators of the crimes 
before the villages where they are said to have committed the crimes.  There, the 
perpetrators are adjudged by a gacaca panel comprised of nineteen individuals from the 
villages through the processes of survivors telling their stories publicly and perpetrators 
understanding their wrongdoings and compensating the genocide survivors and the 
communities.  Unlike national trials, therefore, the gacaca process has been proposed as 
an effective measure that reduces “transportation costs, and generally improves access 
[and that meets local expectations].”229
Overall, the gacaca approach, which has been victim-centered, has had many 
positive results with the restoring of balance within Rwandan communities and especially 
with the restitution and redress for the victims and their families.  For instance, the 
gacaca initial proceedings specifically have called for the compensation of genocide 
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survivors as is demanded by their requests.  As a result, victims’ and their families’ needs 
have been met at the very onset of the procedures.  Moreover, the gacaca approach has 
been participatory and communal.  As Drumbl describes, “gacaca opens a small, but real 
democratic space that creates the possibility for unforeseen, non-hegemonic discussion.  
These discussions could involve issues of accountability for genocide, but also could spill 
over into other areas unrelated to the genocide, thereby promoting … participation.”230  In 
many cases, therefore, such an adaptation of cultural mechanism has enabled victims to 
find support in their communities but also to hold their perpetrators accountable to the 
rest of the village.  But as Drumbl also notes, though, there have been criticisms on the 
part of international lawyers and activists concerning gacaca because of its lack of 
conformity with Western understandings of rule of law.231  To this effect, he indicates, 
“specific examples of such non-conformity include: defense counsel is not available; 
there are limited appeal rights; the decision-makers may not be impartial… the search for 
truth might be undertaken at the expense of justice… and other basic international 
standards might not be met.”232  Nonetheless, though, I hold that positive steps, like the 
taking place of over 760 gacacas as of June 2003 and positive response by and 
involvement of victims, have in main part led to a notion of justice and reconciliation that 
has been closer to the victims’ needs and their communities’, which has been lacked in 
international and national trials.
In other words, the processes of transitional justice in Rwanda provide lessons for 
the case of transitional justice in Cambodia by showing the situations in which national 
and international tribunals, if they lack a connection and involvement of the victims in 
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terms of procedures or conceptions of justice, can fail to achieve its goals of reclaiming 
dignity for the victims.  With the gacaca though, the case of Rwanda demonstrates that 
such cultural mechanisms, even if they do not fully meet international standards, are 
more effective at bringing about reconciliation and acknowledgment for the victims and 
their families.  As Drumbl concludes, “gacaca remains the only foreseeable alternative 
[for Rwanda] by encouraging local justice [that is more relevant to the victims].”233
C.  East Timor
In 1975, after tensions arose between Timorese political parties and erupted into 
armed violence in August 1975, the Indonesian government, under General Suharto, 
claimed that the situation of East Timor posited a security risk on Indonesia.  As a result, 
on December 7, 1975, Indonesia launched a full invasion on East Timor, and by July 
1976, the Indonesian regime went on to formally annex East Timor as its 27th province.234
Occupied by Indonesia between 1975 and 1999, East Timorese resistance, known as 
Fretilin, and its armed forces, Falintil, began to oppose the Indonesian occupation that 
was alleged to have committed “perpetration of gross and widespread human rights 
abuses, including murder, torture, rape, arbitrary detentions and internments, and forced 
displacements.”235  In 1999 though, following a change of leadership in Indonesia, the 
new Indonesian President B.J. Habibie consented to a UN-sponsored referendum that 
would allow East Timorese to decide if they wanted to continue to remain a province of 
Indonesia.
As the ballot took place, most of the votes were cast in favor of independence.  
Frederick Rawski writes, “in August 1999, 78% of Timorese voted to separate from 
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Indonesia, after which the Indonesian military and pro-Jakarta militia destroyed 85% of 
all standing structures, killed between one and two thousand people, and forcibly 
deported 250,000 to the Indonesian side of the island.”236  To ensure the security of East 
Timor’s borders, an Australian-led multi-national force, INTERFET, entered East Timor, 
followed by a UN peacekeeping force.237  In October 1999, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 1272, establishing the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET) to help East Timor “restore order and establish new governance 
structures.”238
While recommendations by the UN International Commission of Inquiry on East 
Timor advocated for the creation of an international body to investigate and prosecute 
those responsible for violations of international law, three special rapporteurs for the UN 
Commission on Human Rights had also earlier suggested that an international tribunal be 
established, unless “steps [were] taken by the government of Indonesia to investigate 
[Indonesian military forces] involvement in the [1999] violence.”239  In response, 
Indonesia, now led by October 1999-elected President Abdurrahman, supported the 
pursuit of justice for East Timor.  As Akhavan mentions, Wahid “indicated his preference 
for trials ‘to take place at home.’”240  As a result, the UN ultimately decided that to deal 
with East Timor’s past of human rights violations, “parallel domestic prosecutions should 
take place in Indonesia and East Timor.  In Indonesia, this was attempted through the 
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establishment of an ad hoc human rights court.  In East Timor, the Special Panels for 
Serious Crimes and the Serious Crimes Unit were established.”241
According to UNTAET, “the prosecutions in East Timor would focus on local 
perpetrators, while the trials in Jakarta would target Indonesian suspects.”  Meanwhile 
though, UNTAET also gave exclusive jurisdiction to East Timor’s Dili District Court in 
matters of serious criminal offenses, namely, “genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity committed at any time, as well as murder, sexual offenses, and torture 
committed between January 1 and October 25, 1999.”242  According to Rawski, in June 
2000, special panels were created within the Dili District Court and the Court of Appeal 
to deal with serious crimes… the panels consisted of two international judges and one 
national judge… the panels were to apply the law of East Timor as well as international 
law.”243  Moreover, in July 2001, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in 
East Timor called for the establishment of a UN truth commission for East Timor with 
Regulation 2001/10.244  Following a number of restorative principles, the Commission for 
Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (CAVR) has held that by establishing the truth, 
perpetrators of non-serious crimes would be “able to take part in a community 
reconciliation process in which they would agree to undertake an act of reconciliation, 
which might include community service or making a symbolic payment after responding 
to victim testimony and admitting and apologizing for their crimes.”245  For Indonesia, 
therefore, the goal of creating the tribunal was to validate its position as a new democracy 
and to hold the military forces accountable for their atrocities and corruption.  For East 
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Timor, the need for trials was embodied in “stressing the importance of reconciliation 
among the East Timorese people and demanding that those responsible for the 1999 
violence be brought to justice.”246  With CAVR, however, the goals of transitional justice 
were expanded to include restoration of victims’ dignity and a catering to their views of 
justice and reconciliation.
As with the case of Rwanda, the tribunal processes involved in Indonesia and East 
Timor to address gross human rights violations failed to meet the needs of the victims 
because of: 1) the victims’ sense that the trials were politically motivated and/or too weak 
to bring about justice for the victims, especially the trials in Indonesia, and 2) the laws 
and rules of procedures and fairness surrounding prosecutorial justice impeded on the 
trials’ abilities to deal with the realities for the victims that were involved in the conflict.  
As Suzannah Linton states, “charges of war crimes require the prosecution to prove the 
existence of armed conflict in East Timor.  The orthodox view is that the East Timor 
conflict began on December 7, 1975 … by the armed forces of Indonesia… [but 
according to international law], East Timor was not then a state, [and thus, restrictions 
apply].”247  Moreover, Linton notes that the tribunals, by focusing on individual cases, 
[did not] “address the truth of what happened in East Timor.  It only [diverted] scarce 
resources.”
248
  In Indonesia, also, the notion of justice was politicized from the onset 
because of the military’s support for the government.  According to Snyder and 
Vinjamuri, “in 2001, following the impeachment of the erratic elected president, 
Abdurrahman Wahid, [President Megawati Sukarnoputri’s] government came to power 
with military backing… as a result, civilian leaders cannot risk a military backlash 
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against an attempt to prosecute senior officers for crimes in East Timor.”249  In other 
words, as weak systems of prosecutorial justice pervaded in East Timor and Indonesia, 
the needs of the victims to have their suffering acknowledged failed to be embodied and 
to take place.  As a survivor of the conflict notes:
On the issue of reconciliation, it should be noted that some international 
organizations show the tendency to impose upon the process rules which are 
merely legal, without even trying to understand the core issues, as if it was they 
who have suffered, and not the Timorese, and that Timorese have feelings too… 
the concept of reconciliation ought to be well understood from its political and 
all-encompassing character, and I mean all-encompassing because they are 
wounds to be healed into scars, in the mothers and fathers, widows and orphans 
and relatives, tagged before as traitors.250
But unlike the tribunals and their lack of resonance with the victims, CAVR had better 
victim-centered results.
For one, Rawski asserts that the truth-telling process involved in CAVR has 
enlisted familiarity with the victims and the Timorese given their tradition of narrative 
history-telling.  As he indicates, “Timorese may not view the ‘truth-seeking’ function of 
the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation as a particularly foreign 
concept.”251  By taking an approach that was culturally sensitive, CAVR has also held 
reconciliation ceremonies.  For instance, in one case, “former militia leaders stood up and 
publicly apologized to the community.”252  Overall, CAVR facilitated hundreds of 
hearings across East Timor and took thousands of statements from victims.  As a result, 
victims were able to share their stories, while the processes were centered on their needs 
and the importance of community awareness and reconciliation.253
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In other words, unlike the tribunal processes, which failed to enlist victims’ 
support and participation, the truth commission in East Timor has aimed at better 
representing the needs for justice for the survivors.  By not focusing on issues of due 
process and international legal standards but instead community reconciliation and 
acknowledgment, the truth commission worked with the communities and the victims to 
re-establish their dignities and their humanity.  
D.  Sierra Leone
For almost ten years, between 1991 and 1999, Sierra Leone experienced a vicious 
civil war between its government and the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) that 
caused the deaths of over 75,000 people.  According to Sierra Leone’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Report, “while there were many factors, both internal and 
external, that explain the cause of the civil war…it was years of bad governance, endemic 
corruption and the denial of basic human rights that created the deplorable conditions that 
made conflict inevitable.”254  During the civil war, an overwhelming majority of the 
crimes was committed by Sierra Leoneans against Sierra Leoneans.  Indeed, government 
and rebel groups like the RUF, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the 
Sierra Leone Army (SLA), and the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) were responsible for 
having authorized or instigated human rights atrocities against civilians.255  As Leebaw 
mentions, “the war in Sierra Leone was notorious for atrocities committed against 
civilians, including murder, mass rape, and the amputation by machete of hands, legs, and 
breasts.  Thousands of children were forced into combat…72% of those who fought with 
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the rebel group, the RUF, claim that they were forced into combat.”256  While a ceasefire 
between the government and the rebel forces took place on May 22, 1999 with the Lomé 
Peace Accord, where rebel leader Foday Sankoh and his followers were granted amnesty 
and appointed in positions like the Vice-Presidency, the fighting nonetheless resumed 
within ten months and resulted in the killings of more Sierra Leoneans.  As Crocker 
comments, the granting of amnesty had dire consequences for Sierra Leone and for the 
rest of Africa, among which was the signal that “atrocities can be committed—especially 
if they are frightening atrocities.”257  Finally, in 2000, British intervention helped the 
government to decisively defeat the rebels.
Resuming talks over peace and transitional justice soon after, the Sierra Leone 
government and the United Nations worked conjunctly to establish a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and a hybrid Special Court, in which the staff was to be 
comprised of foreign and local judges and prosecutors.258  Adhering to principles of 
combining restorative and prosecutorial justice, Sierra Leone and the United Nations 
established the goals of rehabilitation and restoration of justice and dignity for the 
victims, while also upholding the notion of the rule of law and the ending of impunity.259
According to Leebaw, the establishment of the TRC, which was called for by an act of 
parliament in February 2000, “specifies that the purpose of the commission is to establish 
‘an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international 
humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone… to address impunity, to 
respond to the needs of victims, to promote healing, and reconciliation.”260  Moreover, the 
256
 (2004): 9.
257
 (2002): 537.
258
 Leebaw (2004): 10. 
259
 Ibid 10.
260
 Ibid 9.
90
Special aimed at reforming “Sierra Leonean law by aligning it with formal international 
standards, while simultaneously prosecuting top leaders associated with past violence.”261
In order to achieve the goals of establishing truth and reclaiming dignity for Sierra 
Leone’s victims and their families, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has worked 
in compliance with the Lomé Peace Accord, which granted full amnesty to all combatants 
up to its signing on May 22, 1999.  Unlike the South African’s TRC, Sierra Leone’s TRC 
does not seek to “grant amnesty in exchange for confession.”262  However, the abidance of 
the TRC with the Lomé amnesty agreement does not mean that the Special Court will 
also abide by such an agreement.  Instead, the two institutions, by agreeing to operate 
independently of each other and not to share information on cases or investigations, have 
made it possible for perpetrators of gross human rights violations to still be prosecuted by 
the Special Court.  As the Sierra Leone Truth Commission writes, “on January 16, 2002, 
the Government of Sierra Leone reached an agreement with the United Nations for the 
establishment of a Special Court with jurisdiction over pre-Lomé offenses, irrespective of 
amnesty or pardon.”263  In addition to this commitment to truth, the TRC has also laid out 
an integral role for civil society, victims, and their families to play during the procedures 
of establishing the truth commission.  For instance, in preparations for the meeting in 
Lomé in 1999, the Sierra Leonean government held a consultative conference in which 
civil society, students, and other professionals were invited to build a consensus on how 
to bring about peace and reconciliation for Sierra Leone.  Moreover, the TRC has 
integrated the mandate of helping to restore the victims’ human dignity and reconciliation 
in its mission, therefore demonstrating the central role of victim-centered transitional 
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justice upheld by the TRC.  Community leaders and local traditional leaders have also 
been invited to attend and take part in the proceedings.  Other procedures embodied by 
the TRC have included public statement-takings of the victims—as long as the victims 
agreed to do so, public hearings—and the opportunity for the perpetrators to apologize to 
their victims.  As Leebaw indicates, “the commission pursued rehabilitation and 
reintegration of perpetrators by holding a weekly ‘reconciliation ceremony.  Sometimes 
victims and perpetrators would appear together… those who admitted to crimes were 
washed off their evils through a special cleansing ceremony.”264  Overall, the TRC has 
received more than 7,000 statements and held country-wide victim and thematic hearings 
that have enabled victims to reclaim their dignity and to agree that justice has taken place.  
In the end also, the TRC has worked with other government agencies to ensure that 
reconciliation did not stop at apologies but also went further to provide reparations for the 
victims.
Complementary to the TRC, the Special Court has worked to advance the notion 
of the rule of law and the end to impunity.  As mentioned, the Special Court has worked 
independently of the TRC, therefore enabling the Special Court to prosecute individuals 
responsible for gross human rights violations.  As Leebaw writes, the Special Court has 
“the power to prosecute persons ‘who bear the greatest responsibility for serious 
violations of humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean Law.’”265  Unlike the ICTR though, 
the Special Court has taken extra measures to ensure the involvement of the local 
population.  In effect, “the Registry of the Special Court planned a “Court Users 
Committee” comprised of local civil society organizations to give feedback to the Court.  
The Office of the Prosecutor [also] planned to contribute a series of lectures at the 
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university on accountability and human rights.”266  As a result, the Special Court has 
ensured that its commitment to the rule of law and prosecutorial justice resonates with the 
need of victims and their communities to feel empowered and included in the processes.  
As Linton writes, “the Special Court… has been carefully calibrated to fit the 
circumstances of Sierra Leone.”267  Nonetheless though, criticisms over the Special Court 
have also arisen over the time frame that the Court covers.  As Linton mentions, the 
United Nations and the Sierra Leonean government have agreed that the Court’s temporal 
jurisdiction “will cover crimes committed since 30 November 1996, the signing of the 
Abidjan Accords, the first comprehensive peace agreement between the Sierra Leone 
government and the RUF.  As the conflict is ongoing, there is no cut-off date.”268  For the 
victims and their communities, such a time frame has failed to take into account the need 
for justice for the victims of atrocities that were committed between 1991 and 1996.  
Overall, between 2002 and 2003, Marieke Wierda reports that the Special Court has 
issued its first indictments and has to date indicted twelve individuals, including a current 
head of state and leaders of all the factions in the civil war.269  As a result, despite some of 
the drawbacks of the Special Court, the Court has nonetheless begun to function in 
combination with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, ensuring that were 
prosecutorial justice cannot fulfill the needs of the victims, the TRC can still do so 
through public hearings and acknowledgment.
In other words, by looking at the case of Sierra Leone, I hold that the country’s 
new tools of combining different ideals of justice, such as restorative, traditional, and 
prosecutorial, have led to the reinforcement of justice and reconciliation for the victims, 
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their perpetrators, and their communities.  Taking into account the needs for the 
realization of justice for the victims as central, the approaches of the Special Court and 
the TRC have led many Sierra Leoneans to participate in the processes and to view these 
approaches as valid for their realities.
E.  Summary of cases
After having examined contemporary cases of transitional justice in South Africa, 
Rwanda, East Timor, and Sierra Leone, I hold that the need to center transitional justice 
mechanisms around the victims and their realities is crucial to ensure that the goals of 
achieving acknowledgment, recovering history and truth, and enabling victims to regain 
their dignity and humanity can occur.  Overall, the cases of Rwanda and East Timor 
indicate how prosecutorial justice embodied in tribunals can have adverse effects on 
transitional justice and fail to achieve goals of moving forward for the country if victims 
feel alienated from the processes.  South Africa and East Timor also demonstrated the 
potentials of truth commissions in uncovering history and bringing about 
acknowledgment and national reconciliation.  However, South Africa’s TRC also 
indicated the drawbacks of granting amnesty to perpetrators in exchange for their 
testimonies, especially when the victims and their families themselves may not agree 
with such policies.  Sierra Leone, moreover, pointed out the potential balance that can be 
reached between prosecutorial, restorative, and traditional justice in which tribunals, truth 
commissions, and cultural mechanisms can be employed to help victims regain their 
dignity and humanity, all the while also pursuing the goals of establishing a rule of law 
and better accountability system for the emerging democracy.  To conclude this section, 
therefore, I summarize the mechanisms and their effects/potentials at achieving/having 
achieved transitional justice for the victims.  In doing so, I use this table as a point of 
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reference and comparative analysis to support the need for how a more victim-centered 
model of transitional justice can take place for Cambodia. 
Table 1: Were Elements of Victim-Centered Justice Consciousness Included in 
Contemporary Transitional Justice Situations?
Transitional Justice Mechanisms and 
Whether or Not They Are Victim-
Centered
South 
Africa
Rwanda East 
Timor
Sierra 
Leone
Truth Commissions Yes N/A Yes Yes
Amnesties No N/A N/A Yes
International Criminal Tribunals N/A No N/A N/A
National Tribunals No No No N/A
Mixed Tribunals N/A N/A N/A Yes
Cultural Mechanisms Yes Yes Yes Yes
III.  Cambodia and the State of Victim-Centered Justice
In this section, I explore examples of suggestions that have been proposed to 
bring about a more victim-centered transitional justice in Cambodia.  In doing so, I look 
at the works of Craig Etcheson and his writings on faith traditions in Cambodia, Steven 
Ratner and Jason Abrams and their insights on how different mechanisms of transitional 
justice can be engaged for Cambodia, and reports from conferences and symposiums in 
which Cambodian civil society representatives discuss the why’s and how’s of taking into 
account justice for survivors approaches.  At the end of this chapter, I intend to use these 
suggestions to craft a more victim-centered model of transitional justice for Cambodia.
First, Craig Etcheson’s work on faith traditions and reconciliation in Cambodia 
examines meaningful ways in which Cambodia’s faith traditions can be utilized as 
enabling factors and repository mechanisms to bring about reconciliation and justice that 
can be culturally meaningful for Cambodia’s survivors.270  By focusing on the uses of 
rituals within the Buddhist religion, in which the core values of compassion, kindness, 
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joy, equity, and justice are embodied, Etcheson indicates the role that such rituals can 
play in bringing about reconciliation and healing for survivors in the aftermath of gross 
human rights violations or genocide.271  Among the rituals that Etcheson highlights, he 
demonstrates the role of reintegration of perpetrators and forgiveness and healing that can 
take place for the victims.  As he writes:
The teuch mun ritual, which involves monks sprinkling blessed water on persons 
or objects, is performed to ward off evil spirits and bad luck, and has also been 
used to help ensure successful reintegration when former Khmer Rouge return to 
their non-Khmer Rouge home villages.  The rab bat ritual involves the faithful 
giving food or other gifts to monks, a process which is said to relieve feelings of 
anger in those giving the gifts.  The Sangha tien ritual is a ceremony performed 
by monks either for dead or living people, and victims and perpetrators have been 
known to jointly engage in this rite, helping to heal the chasm between them and 
bringing them together… another ritual, more traditional than spiritual, is known 
as the salaboun, and is so named for a place in the community where people 
gather to discuss problems and conflicts in encounters that are usually mediated 
by village elders.272
Culturally and religiously meaningful to the victims, therefore, these processes of 
reconciliation and justice can serve as potential answers to how Cambodia can deal with 
its past of gross human rights violations.  More so also, Etcheson highlights the 
importance that such local rituals can have on resolving tensions that have pervaded 
Cambodian localities today, where “Cambodians live side-by-side with local Khmer 
Rouge leaders who were responsible for the execution of their loved ones during the 
Khmer Rouge regime.”273  In other words, as rituals have become important cultural 
mechanisms that have served to reintegrate perpetrators as well as bring closure or 
healing to the victims, Etcheson’s analysis of faith and cultural traditions are crucial 
elements that can contribute to a renewed sense of victim-centered transitional justice for 
Cambodia.
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In addition to Etcheson, Ratner and Abrams have also written on the issue of 
other mechanisms that Cambodia can employ to achieve more victim-centered 
approaches of transitional justice.  Rather than examine culture-specific mechanisms, 
though, Ratner and Abrams discuss the potential benefits of incorporating investigatory 
commissions and civil suit measures to enhance processes of justice for the survivors.  
On the issue of investigatory commission, Ratner and Abrams highlight the important 
interests of acknowledgment, healing, and spiritual reparation that can be achieved for the 
victims, as well as the greater impacts on Cambodia’s emerging democracy and 
enhancement of governmental credibility that can take place if proper mandates, 
structures, and regulations are implemented for the investigatory commission.  Moreover, 
Ratner and Abrams highlight the possibility of victims and their families relying on the 
route of civil action against Khmer Rouge leaders under laws such as the U.S. Alien Tort 
Claims Act or their foreign equivalents.  In such a way, victims can feel empowered to 
legally hold their perpetrators accountable, although the level to which punishment can 
take place is limited to monetary and psychological compensation.  Overall, therefore, 
Ratner and Abrams’ exploration of different mechanisms besides the Khmer Rouge 
tribunal serves to show the complementary roles that investigatory commissions and civil 
suits can play to ensure that victims’ needs are met.
Finally, Cambodian civil society has also been active at voicing recommendations 
concerning how transitional justice can be better victim-centered in their country.  Unlike 
Etcheson, Ratner, and Abrams, however, most civil society representatives have sought 
to rectify the imbalance of voices that are inherent in current processes of the Khmer 
Rouge tribunal rather than examine alternative mechanisms that can be pursued to 
achieve victim-based justice.  In this regard, civil society members have criticized their 
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lack of input and voice in the process of setting up the tribunal.  As one conference 
participant mentioned, “the negotiations that took place between the Cambodian 
government and UN since March 1999 were dominated by the agendas of Cambodian 
officials and foreigners.  Public opinion and the view of Cambodian NGOs did not figure 
prominently into the debate on how the tribunal should be structured.”274  As a result, civil 
society members have put forward a range of objectives that the tribunal should seek to 
achieve, among which are the creation of justice for victims by holding the perpetrators 
accountable, the provision of explanations for why the Khmer Rouge undertook to kill 
their own people, the catalyst to enable Cambodian society to heal, and the serving as a 
model to reform Cambodia’s legal system.275  In addition, civil society representatives 
have also pointed out the need for more international participation in the tribunal process, 
especially given the corruption and lack of credibility that Cambodia’s current court 
systems hold.  For many of the conference participants, to allow the Cambodian 
government to direct the course of the tribunal at its whim is dangerous and may prove to 
result in a political show rather than accountability of the perpetrators and justice for the 
victims.  Hence, by calling for greater participation of civil society and more inclusion, 
civil society members have also made important suggestions as to how the goals of 
achieving justice for the victims can still be incorporated within current structures of 
transitional justice in Cambodia.
With these suggestions and recommendations in mind, as well as the lessons from 
comparative case studies, I now move to describe my vision of how an effective victim-
centered model of transitional justice can take place for Cambodia.
274 See Kelli Muddell, “Transitional Justice in Cambodia: Challenges and Opportunities.” Symposium 
Report, Asia Society, 9 Sept. 2003, 5 Aug. 2005 <http:www.asiasource.org/asip/Cambodia_report.pdf>.
275
 Ibid.
98
IV.  A Victim-Centered Model of Transitional Justice for Cambodia
With the comparative analysis of the transitional justice cases in South Africa, 
Rwanda, East Timor, and Sierra Leone, I have demonstrated the importance of having 
victims and their families participate or be in accord with the mechanism(s) of 
transitional justice in order for successful justice to take place.  Indeed, the International 
Center for Transitional Justice resonates with this approach, writing that “while 
prosecutions must necessarily focus on the accused, these efforts should also aim to 
restore victims’ dignity and public confidence in the rule of law [and the new 
government].”276  For Cambodia, therefore, successful transitional justice mechanisms 
signify that the needs of the victims must be taken into account, encompassing a victim-
centered approach.  However, it also means that in this victim-centered approach, victims 
are not re-victimized but rather empowered as agents to find positive solutions to the 
processes of transitional justice, democracy-building, and moving forward as a society.
Where 75-85 percent of Cambodian respondents stated in a questionnaire 
administered by the Center for Social Development in Cambodia that they favor a 
tribunal for the Khmer Rouge leadership, it is clear that the tribunal currently underway 
must be included in the victim-centered model.  However, as current proceedings have 
been led by the Cambodian Government with little say from the international community 
and have been deemed by most Cambodians as being suspicious because of the corrupt 
Cambodian legal system, such processes must be re-evaluated.  As one participant at the 
Asia Society Symposium noted, there exists “a systemic lack of trust among the 
[Cambodian] public in their democratic institutions… impunity is rampant, as crimes 
such as the expropriation of people’s land, torture, and killings frequently go 
276 See “Transitional Justice Approaches,” 2005.
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unpunished.”277  In effect, a more victim-centered model calls for the tribunal to give the 
United Nations a greater role, especially with regards to the selection of judges, both 
international and national.  Moreover, victims, their families, and civil society must be 
included in the procedures, where activities such as public outreach about the tribunal, 
public platforms where victims can have inputs on what they would like to see from the 
tribunal, and involvement of NGOs in the tribunal procedures can be implemented.  
According to Etcheson, “public outreach programs that will work not only in Phnom 
Penh, but also in the provinces,” are beginning to take place in Cambodia but are far from 
being realized yet.278  Hence, by giving victims a leadership role in the processes of 
transitional justice, victims will have the opportunities to feel self-empowered and to take 
leadership of their lives.
Given that the tribunal is limited in its prosecutorial scope, other important 
mechanisms such as a truth and reconciliation commission and the culturally based 
mechanisms of teuch mun, Sangha tien, and Srang Preah proposed by Craig Etcheson 
can be used to further enhance the victim-centered model that I envision for Cambodia.  
As David Crocker has made it clear, “victims or their families should be provided with a 
platform to tell their stories and have their testimony publicly acknowledged [and that 
such procedures are] essential to empower citizens.”279  As a result, I see a truth and 
reconciliation commission as providing the avenue for the victims and their families to 
hear answers to the persistent questions that continue today in Cambodia, which are 
“why?”, “why did Pol Pot do it?”, “why did we have to suffer so much?”, and “why was 
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our country destroyed by its own children?”280  By following a similar approach to Sierra 
Leone, where amnesty is not granted to the perpetrators and where the commission works 
as a separate entity from the prosecutorial mechanism, a truth and reconciliation
commission can be an effective way for the victims and their families to tell their stories, 
face their perpetrators, have their suffering acknowledged publicly, and perhaps, forgive 
their perpetrators.  For such a commission to be successful, though, victim and civil 
society participation in the procedures is important.  For example, this means that public 
platforms must be held to inform Cambodians of the commission, the commission must 
be located in accessible locations, village leaders must be consulted, and NGOs must be 
involved to give oversight to the commission.  On the other hand, such access to victims 
also require victims and their families to play an active role in the procedures, especially 
in coming forward to tell their stories and to actively find solutions as to how, as a 
society, they can move forward living with their perpetrators.
To ensure that the processes of transitional justice are relevant to the victims and 
their families, culturally based mechanisms such as the faith-based traditions proposed by 
Etcheson can also be put in place to complement the tribunal and truth and reconciliation 
commission.  As shown with the case of Rwanda, culturally based mechanisms are 
important to ensure that the victims and their perpetrators can reconcile, especially if they 
have to live in close proximity of one another.  By using religious values of forgiveness, 
tolerance, and acknowledgment, mechanisms like teuch mun, Sangha tien, and Srang 
Preah, which are performed by Buddhist monks, can thus be a way to have perpetrators 
acknowledge their wrongdoing and for victims and their families to be recognized by 
their community for the wrong done to them.  To confirm that these processes are victim-
280 (2003): 8.
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centered though, the culturally based mechanisms should similarly involve the victims, 
their families, and their communities in the consultation and implementation procedures.
Finally, other elements that promote the victim-centered model that I envision 
include the evidence-gathering activities that have been undertaken by DC-CAM, 
memorial museums in dedication of the victims that have died during the Khmer Rouge 
era, and death rituals where possible in memory of the victims.  All of these factors 
would enhance the needs of the victims and their families to know the truth about the 
events that took place under the Khmer Rouge, to have their suffering acknowledged and 
recognized, and to provide the proper rituals for the dead so that they can now live in 
peace.  As Etcheson attests, “during the Khmer Rouge regime, huge numbers of people 
were killed or otherwise expired without the benefit of proper death ceremonies.  As a 
result, many Cambodians believe that there are millions of restless spirits wandering the 
country.”281  In addition, in a letter addressed to King Sihanouk, a group of Cambodians 
overseas wrote that “the souls of those people cannot go on to their new life… in the 
name of the parents and children still alive we ask the government to gather the bones to 
bury or cremate them according to our beliefs.”282
In other words, the victim-centered mechanisms that I have just proposed are but 
a few examples of ways in which victim-based transitional justice can be implemented in 
Cambodia in order to ensure that the victims, their families, and their communities can 
indeed experience justice for the wrongs done to them more than three decades earlier by 
the Khmer Rouge.  Where the notion of a tribunal has been supported by the victims and 
their families, it is clear that doing away with the tribunal is not a feasible idea.  As a 
281
 (2004): 24.
282
 See “Despite Buddhist Belief, Cambodia won’t burn evidence of genocide,” Agence France Presse, 29 
Mar. 2001.
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result, to take into account the needs of the victims, the tribunal must undergo changes by 
providing a greater role for the UN and more civil society participation.  In addition, 
given that the experiences of South Africa, Rwanda, East Timor, and Sierra Leone have 
shown the benefits that can be derived from a combination of prosecutorial and 
reparatory justice, the victim-centered model that I envision also includes a truth 
commission, museums, and culturally based mechanisms to sustain the idea of a victim-
based justice.  In conclusion, the victim-centered model that I propose for Cambodia is 
one that is based on the elements of truth, memory, history, acknowledgment, and 
accountability that have been voiced by victims and their families as important to their 
idea of justice.  As I have discussed though, the criteria in all these different mechanisms 
is to ensure that victims take leadership in the processes and that these individuals work 
towards self-empowerment and finding solutions to make democracy work in their 
country.  Indeed, without such outlook towards the future, transitional justice cannot take 
place and reconciliation and the aspects of moving forward will continue to remain 
stagnant.  To end this chapter, hence, I summarize how the proposed mechanisms under 
the proposed victim-centered model are more congruent with the commitments to justice 
for the victims than the tribunal-only mechanism that is being put in place today.283
Table 2: Comparing Today’s Khmer Rouge Tribunal with the Proposed Victim-Centered 
Model
Today’s Tribunal Processes Proposed Victim- Centered 
Model
Victims’ Participation/Civil 
Society Input
X
Implementation of 
Culturally Based 
X
283 Like Craig Etcheson personally mentioned to me, though, I recognize that these efforts may only be a 
way to bring back the humanity and dignity that were taken away from the victims and their families by the 
Khmer Rouge and that these efforts may never make these individuals fully “whole” again.  See Craig 
Etcheson, “Re: Honor’s Paper,” email to the author.  21 Feb. 2006.
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Mechanisms
Resonance with Victims’ 
Views of Justice
X X
Public Platform for Victims 
and their Families to Tell 
their Stories
X
Platform for 
Acknowledgment, 
Reconciliation, and/or 
Forgiveness between 
Victims and Perpetrators
X
Accountability for Top 
Leaders of Khmer Rouge
X X
Accountability for Non-Top 
Leaders of Khmer Rouge
X
Chapter Five
Conclusion
“There must be no compromise on due process or judicial impartiality and 
integrity.  Clearly, United Nations involvement will legitimize any ventures 
providing tainted justice and it must therefore reject options that are not feasible 
and must not support any enterprises that are unlikely to meet the minimal 
standards of justice… with its own reputation and that of the principles it 
represents at stake, the United Nations cannot afford to be involved in failed 
experiments in international justice.”
--Suzannah Linton284
“The crimes committed under the Khmer Rouge were of a character and scale 
that it was still almost impossible to comprehend… the victims of those horrific 
crimes had waited too long for justice… the international community will do its 
part to ensure that, however late, and however imperfect, impunity will not 
remain unchallenged, and a measure of justice will be done.  That will be a 
precious and important gift to Cambodia.”
--Secretary-General Kofi Annan285
284
“Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice,” Criminal Law Forum
12 (2001): 242.
285 See UN Press Release, “Governments pledge $38.48 million for Khmer Rouge trials.”  Global Policy 
Forum, United Nations, 28 Mar. 2005, 11 Oct. 2005 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/cambodia/2005/0328pledge.htm>.
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“This [the tribunal for the Khmer Rouge] is not about politics, this is about 
justice.”
--Hun Sen286
I.  Introduction
In this final chapter, I look at the political and social incentives for why the 
Cambodian Government and the United Nations should follow the victim-centered model 
of transitional justice that I have proposed.  In doing so, I analyze statements made and 
actions taken by the Cambodian government and the United Nations that commit these 
parties to ensuring that the victims’ needs for truth, history, and acknowledgment are met.  
Where all public policy recommendations inevitably include costs and drawbacks, I also 
mention the economic, social, and/or political challenges that the Cambodian government 
and the UN may face in adopting the victim-centered model.  To overcome these limits, 
however, I address ways in which these obstacles can be dealt with and how the results 
derived from a more victim-centered model can enhance the political, social, and 
economic priorities faced by the Cambodian government and the UN.
Moreover, I write about additional research that can be done on the issue of 
transitional justice in Cambodia and the avenues that have been opened as a result of this 
research.  As the victim- centered model that I have proposed should be thought as a 
starting point to think about ways in which prosecutorial and restorative justice can be 
combined to meet the needs of the victims and their families, I want to make sure to 
allow flexibility for the addition of other mechanisms of transitional justice that focus on 
the victims.
286 See Craig Etcheson, “The Politics of Genocide Justice in Cambodia,” Montreal Institute of Genocide 
and Human Rights Studies, Sept. 2003: 1.
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Finally, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, this concluding chapter is also 
an opportunity for me to discuss the significance of writing this thesis as the daughter of 
Cambodian refugees.  While the importance of academic research is based on impartiality 
and objectivity, I mention the difficulty nonetheless that I faced in ensuring that the 
viewpoint provided in this project did not pre-judge or condemn the Khmer Rouge as 
violators of human rights without looking first at the conditions that contributed to the 
rise of the Khmer Rouge.   
II.  Making the Case to the Cambodian Government
As I have illustrated in the previous chapters, the Cambodian Government’s 
behavior throughout the processes of establishing the Khmer Rouge tribunal has faced 
both criticism and praise by Cambodian society and the international community.  As 
Etcheson indicates, “the struggle for genocide justice in Cambodia has been ongoing for 
more than a quarter century… the interests of both Cambodian domestic actors as well as 
actors in the many other nations that have chosen to involve themselves in Cambodia’s 
affairs over the last three decades have intersected to create a terrible political tangle.”287
At issue for the Cambodian Government, to summarize, have been several considerations 
and dilemmas, which include: living up to its statements of finding justice for 
Cambodia’s victims; responding effectively to international pressures without damaging 
relationships with countries like China, the US, and Japan; balancing domestic political 
pressures without losing political advantage; and ensuring that the conditions for 
democracy-building are present to gain political and economic legitimacy domestically 
and internationally.
287
 Ibid 1. 
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In light of these conditions, therefore, I note that the Cambodian Government will 
only adopt a more victim-centered model as proposed in the previous chapter if the 
economic, social, and political factors mentioned are addressed and dealt with.  In my 
view, adopting a more victim-centered approach as outlined will necessitate the 
government to: 1) be less ambiguous; 2) allow the United Nations to play a greater role in 
the tribunal proceedings; 3) risk creating tensions within the domestic and international 
political arenas; 4) provide more participation for civil society, victims, and their 
families; and 5) invest more time and money in the processes of transitional justice.  In 
doing so, I am of the position that the benefits derived from a more victim-centered 
model will not only resonate with the priorities held by the Cambodian Government but 
will also result in successes and rewards that will be politically, economically, and 
socially beneficial for the government and Cambodia.
For one, taking a less ambiguous stance will increase the Cambodian 
Government’s credibility in the eyes of Cambodian society and the international 
community and will result in more legitimacy and sovereignty.  As participants in the 
Asia Society Symposium have complained, the continually changing contexts of the 
tribunal have undermined the faith of Cambodians in their government and in the efforts 
to deal with the country’s legacy of human rights abuses.288  By actively following a more 
victim-centered model, the Cambodian Government will take the steps to demonstrate to 
its constituents and the international community that it is being held accountable to its 
people and to the values of truth and justice.  As the case of South Africa has shown us, a 
government’s commitment to justice and community empowerment are key to the 
building of democracy, public involvement, and stability in the country.
288 See Kelli Muddell, “Transitional Justice in Cambodia: Challenges and Opportunities.”  Symposium 
Report, Asia Society, 9 Sept. 2003, 5 Aug. 2005 <http:www.asiasource.org/asip/Cambodia_report.pdf>.
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In addition, allowing the United Nations to play a greater role in the transitional 
justice processes should not be seen by the Cambodian Government as an interference to 
its sovereignty but as a means to ensuring that Cambodia can take effective steps towards 
democracy-building, social stability, and acknowledgment of a hurtful past.  In effect, the 
Cambodian Government’s current lack of cooperation with the UN, as seen with tensions 
in funding the tribunal and agreeing to the terms of procedures of the tribunal289, should 
be re-evaluated.  By giving the UN a more defined role, the Cambodian Government can 
give more legitimacy to its commitment to transitional justice, especially given the 
authority that the UN holds in the international community today and with regards to 
post-conflict resolution tribunals.  As Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen 
themselves mentioned in a letter to Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1997, “we are aware 
of similar [transitional justice] efforts to respond to the genocide and crimes against 
humanity in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and ask that similar assistance be given 
to Cambodia.”290
Finally, if the Cambodian Government is to follow the victim-centered model that 
I have proposed, it should be ready to give more participation to civil society, both 
domestic and international.  With mechanisms of truth and reconciliation commissions 
and community dialogues that I included in my model, it is evident that the Cambodian 
Government must be willing to be more open and inclusive of civil society, especially 
with regards to NGOs and the involvement of victims and their families.  As members of 
NGOs have already stated, the current processes of transitional justice in Cambodia have 
lacked inputs from civil society and have kept victims and their families in the dark.  To 
289 See Bangkok Post, “Khmer Tribunal Stalled Again,” Global Policy Forum, Aug. 22, 2005, 5 Sept. 2005 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/cambodia/2005/0822stall.htm>.
290 See Susan E. Cook, “Prosecuting Genocide in Cambodia: the Winding Path Towards Justice,” The 
Tribunals, May 2001, 10 Aug. 2005 <http://www.crimesofwar.org/tribun-mag/cambodia_print.html>.
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rectify this situation, a much more holistic approach, such as the victim-centered model, 
is necessary to recover truth and history and move towards reconciliation.291  For the 
Cambodian Government, such change of approach can have political, economic, and 
social benefits that include increased legitimacy, social empowerment of the Cambodian 
people, increased credibility in the eyes of donor countries, and more efficiency for the 
transitional justice processes.
Overall, therefore, the Cambodian Government has much to gain from following 
the more victim-centered approach that I have suggested in this research.  Although it is 
certain that the Hun Sen Government might face opposition within its party and from 
international partners like China that do not support the prosecution of the Khmer Rouge 
but rather advocate a forget-the-past approach, the potential benefits that can be derived
from the victim-centered models nonetheless resonate with the priorities set by the 
Cambodian Government.  As indicated, potential successes include the building of 
legitimacy, sovereignty, credibility, political and economic support, and democracy in a 
country whose past of human rights atrocities continue to impede upon its state-building 
growth.  In other words, it is time that the Cambodian Government take actions to change 
the view held by so many that the “practice of Cambodia’s democracy is corrupt and 
easily manipulated,292” into one where Cambodia’s constituents and international 
community begin to recognize that democracy can become a reality.
III.  Making the Case to the United Nations
Like the Cambodian Government, the UN also has much to gain from following 
the more victim-centered model that I analyze in this research.  At issue for the UN, 
however, are different concerns that involve maintaining its legitimacy and authority in 
291 See Kelli Muddell, 2003.
292
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the international community, maintaining world order, holding accountable perpetrators 
of gross human rights violations, and ensuring that Cambodia’s victims and their families 
are acknowledged for their suffering.  According to Craig Etcheson, the role of the UN in 
Cambodia “seems to be that Annan [feels] that he and the UN have something to prove 
after the UN’s debacles in Rwanda and the Balkans.  The Secretary-General has publicly 
commented many times about the UN’s failure to protect the people of Rwanda in1994, 
and has vowed that the UN will improve its performance on issues pertaining to 
genocide.”293  So far, though, much discontent has arisen from the international 
community and Cambodian civil society concerning the UN’s role in the proceedings of 
transitional justice in Cambodia.  Scott Luftglass, for instance, has written that “the UN 
should either demand the establishment of an ad hoc international tribunal for Cambodia 
(with goals and structures similar to existing tribunals created for the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda), or completely withdraw from any involvement with the adjudication of the 
Khmer Rouge crimes.  Any alternative would compromise the best interests of the 
international community, the development and enforcement of international law, and the 
stability and rehabilitation of Cambodia.”294  By taking a more victim-centered approach 
of transitional justice, I assert that the UN could address many of the current objections 
that have been voiced concerning the tribunal, all the while ensuring that the victims’ 
needs for justice and acknowledgment are met.
By following the victim-centered model, the UN will inevitably have to deal with 
several issues that include: 1) upholding the needs of the victims and their families above 
a strict interpretation of international law; that is, the UN must be willing to support
293 (2003): 15.
294
 “Crossroads in Cambodia: the United Nation’s Responsibility to Withdraw Involvement from the 
Establishment of a Cambodian Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge,” Virginia Law Review 90 (2004): 
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efforts like truth and reconciliation commissions and community-based dialogues; 2) 
being ready to demand more participation in the processes of transitional justice in 
Cambodia, especially as it purports to the selection of judges for the tribunal and the 
creation of codes of ethics and procedures; and 3) continuing to advocate for the 
prosecution of gross human rights violators.  Where it is clear that strict interpretations of 
international law based on prosecutorial justice have not been effective in cases like 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and East Timor, the UN must recognize and support transitional 
justice mechanisms that will incorporate a balance of prosecutorial and restorative justice 
for the sake of Cambodia’s victims and their families.  In doing so, the UN could help to 
revive the notions of justice and faith in the Cambodian Government and international 
community among Cambodian survivors and their families.  As already discussed, the 
tribunal has come to be viewed today by many as a political show meant to please 
international donors rather than fulfill the ideals of justice and acknowledgement.  It is 
thus time for the UN to ask for an examination of the transitional justice processes in 
Cambodia and to become more accountable to Cambodia’s victims and their families.
In order to overcome objections from the Cambodian Government and other 
countries that might resist greater involvement of the UN in transitional justice planning 
and implementation, the UN should refer to its authority in the international community 
and experiences with transitional justice in the cases of Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and East 
Timor.  In so doing, the UN can point out the legitimacy that UN involvement provided 
in these circumstances for the survivors and their families.  Moreover, given that the UN 
is playing a key role in financing the tribunal (more than half of the assessed $50 million 
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needed)295, the UN can also use this leverage to assert that transitional justice procedures 
meet standards of international justice.   
In other words, the UN’s political and social priorities of seeing the Khmer Rouge 
brought to justice and ensuring that impunity no longer dominates the human rights arena 
will be met if the UN enforces a victim-centered approach to transitional justice in 
Cambodia.  Although resistance and objections are likely to arise over the definitions of 
justice, international law, and the role of sovereignty, the UN must nonetheless be willing 
to play a more active role in Cambodia by using the political, social, and economic 
leverages that it holds in the international community.  In my view, failure to do so will 
undermine the possibilities for truth and acknowledgment for the victims and their 
families.
IV.  Possibilities for Additional Research
As I end this chapter, I want to note the avenues for additional research that can 
be explored on the subjects of Cambodia, transitional justice, and democracy.  As already 
indicated, the victim-centered model proposed in this research should not be seen as a 
fixed and non-malleable model.  Instead, this project should be seen as an opportunity to 
start thinking about how the ideas of acknowledgment, history, truth, justice, and moving 
forward around the needs of the victims and their families can be incorporated to ensure 
positive results for nations trying to deal with their pasts of human rights violations.  
Given that the tribunal processes in Cambodia have yet to fully take off (funding is still to 
be secured, judges to be selected, and procedures to be written), it is certain that more 
concerns will arise and mechanisms identified to ensure the involvement of victims and 
civil society.  For example, Etcheson recently mentioned to me that there is presently 
295
 “Khmer Rouge tribunal approved.” BBC News, 10 Aug. 2005 
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ideas circulating about how to encourage victims to partake in testimony-giving during 
the trial procedures and that efforts are being undertaken to involve civil society. 
In my view, examples of additional research questions/issues to investigate are 1) 
the interconnection between Cambodia’s political situation during King Sihanouk after 
independence and today’s political activities with the Hun Sen government; 2) the 
effectiveness of restorative justice over prosecutorial justice through a more 
comprehensive analysis of cases like the Nuremberg trials, the former Yugoslavia, and 
Rwanda; and 3) the social, moral, political, and economical implications for why nations 
with pasts of gross human rights violations need to deal with those wrongs through 
acknowledgment in order to reinstate stability, truth, democracy, and trust in their new 
societies.
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Appendix
Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of
amendments as promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006).
LAW ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EXTRAORDINARY 
CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA FOR THE 
PROSECUTION OF CRIMES COMMITTED DURING THE 
PERIOD OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1:
The purpose of this law is to bring to trial senior leaders of Democratic 
Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious 
violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, 
and international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed 
during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.
CHAPTER II
COMPETENCE
Article 2 new
Extraordinary Chambers shall be established in the existing court structure, 
namely the trial court and the supreme court to bring to trial senior leaders of 
Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and 
serious violations of Cambodian laws related to crimes, international 
humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognized by 
Cambodia, that were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 
January 1979.
Senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible 
for the above acts are hereinafter designated as “Suspects”.
Article 3 new
The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all Suspects 
who committed any of these crimes set forth in the 1956 Penal Code, and which 
were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979:
• Homicide (Article 501, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507 and 508)
• Torture (Article 500)
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• Religious Persecution (Articles 209 and 210)
The statute of limitations set forth in the 1956 Penal Code shall be extended for 
an additional 30 years for the crimes enumerated above, which are within the 
jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers.
The penalty under Articles 209, 500, 506 and 507 of the 1956 Penal Code shall be
limited to a maximum of life imprisonment, in accordance with Article 32 of the
Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, and as further stipulated in Articles 
38 and 39 of this Law.
Article 4
The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all Suspects 
who committed the crimes of genocide as defined in the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, and which were 
committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.
The acts of genocide, which have no statute of limitations, mean any acts 
committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, such as:
• killing members of the group;
• causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
• deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
• imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
• forcibly transferring children from one group to another group.
The following acts shall be punishable under this Article:
• attempts to commit acts of genocide;
• conspiracy to commit acts of genocide;
• participation in acts of genocide.
Article 5
The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all Suspects 
who committed crimes against humanity during the period 17 April 1975 to 6 
January 1979.  Crimes against humanity, which have no statute of limitations, are 
any acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population, on national, political, ethnical, racial or religious 
grounds, such as:
• murder;
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• extermination;
• enslavement;
• deportation;
• imprisonment;
• torture;
• rape;
• persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds;
• other inhumane acts.
Article 6
The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all Suspects 
who committed or ordered the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, such as the following acts against persons or 
property protected under provisions of these Conventions, and which were 
committed during the period 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979:
• wilful killing;
• torture or inhumane treatment;
• wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
• destruction and serious damage to property, not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
• compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile
power;
• wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or civilian the rights of fair and regular
trial;
• unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian;
• taking civilians as hostages.
Article 7
The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all Suspects 
most responsible for the destruction of cultural property during armed conflict 
pursuant to the 1954 Hague Convention for Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict, and which were committed during the period from 
17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.
Article 8
The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all Suspects 
most responsible for crimes against internationally protected persons pursuant to 
the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Relations, and which were 
committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.
CHAPTER III
COMPOSITION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS
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Article 9 new
The Trial Chamber shall be an Extraordinary Chamber composed of five 
professional judges, of whom three are Cambodian judges with one as president, 
and two foreign judges; and before which the Co-Prosecutors shall present their 
cases. The president shall appoint one or more clerks of the court to participate.
The Supreme Court Chamber, which shall serve as both appellate chamber and 
final instance, shall be an Extraordinary Chamber composed of seven judges, of 
whom four are Cambodian judges with one as president, and three foreign 
judges; and before which the Co-Prosecutors shall present their cases. The 
president shall appoint one or more clerks of the court to participate.
CHAPTER IV
APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES
Article 10 new
The judges of the Extraordinary Chambers shall be appointed from among the
currently practising judges or are additionally appointed in accordance with the
existing procedures for appointment of judges; all of whom shall have high 
moral character, a spirit of impartiality and integrity, and experience, 
particularly in criminal law or international law, including international 
humanitarian law and human rights law.
Judges shall be independent in the performance of their functions, and shall not 
accept or seek any instructions from any government or any other source.
Article 11 new
The Supreme Council of the Magistracy shall appoint at least seven Cambodian 
judges to act as judges of the Extraordinary Chambers, and shall appoint reserve 
judges as needed, and shall also appoint the President of each of the 
Extraordinary Chambers from the above Cambodian judges so appointed, in 
accordance with the existing procedures for appointment of judges.
The reserve Cambodian judges shall replace the appointed Cambodian judges in 
case of their absence. These reserve judges may continue to perform their regular 
duties in their respective courts.
The Supreme Council of the Magistracy shall appoint at least five individuals of
foreign nationality to act as foreign judges of the Extraordinary Chambers upon
nomination by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
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The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall submit a list of not less than 
seven candidates for foreign judges to the Royal Government of Cambodia, from 
which the Supreme Council of the Magistracy shall appoint five sitting judges 
and at least two reserve judges. In addition to the foreign judges sitting in the 
Extraordinary Chambers and present at every stage of the proceedings, the 
President of each Chamber may, on a case-by-case basis, designate one or more 
reserve foreign judges already appointed by the Supreme Council of the 
Magistracy to be present at each stage of the trial, and to replace a foreign judge 
if that judge is unable to continue sitting.
Article 12
All judges under this law shall enjoy equal status and conditions of service 
according to each level of the Extraordinary Chambers.
Each judge under this law shall be appointed for the period of these proceedings.
Article 13
Judges shall be assisted by Cambodian and international staff as needed in their
offices.
In choosing staff to serve as assistants and law clerks, the Director of the Office of
Administration shall interview if necessary and, with the approval of the 
Cambodian judges by majority vote, hire staff who shall be appointed by the 
Royal Government of Cambodia. The Deputy Director of the Office of 
Administration shall be responsible for the recruitment and administration of all 
international staff. The number of assistants and law clerks shall be chosen in 
proportion to the Cambodian judges and foreign judges.
Cambodian staff shall be selected from Cambodian civil servants or other 
qualified nationals of Cambodia, if necessary.
CHAPTER V
DECISIONS OF THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS
Article 14 new
1. The judges shall attempt to achieve unanimity in their decisions. If this is not
possible, the following shall apply:
a. a decision by the Extraordinary Chamber of the trial court shall require the
affirmative vote of at least four judges;
b. a decision by the Extraordinary Chamber of the Supreme Court shall require
the affirmative vote of at least five judges.
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2. When there is no unanimity, the decision of the Extraordinary Chambers shall
contain the opinions of the majority and the minority.
Article 15
The Presidents shall convene the appointed judges at the appropriate time to 
proceed with the work of the Extraordinary Chambers.
CHAPTER VI
CO-PROSECUTORS
Article 16
All indictments in the Extraordinary Chambers shall be the responsibility of two
prosecutors, one Cambodian and another foreign, hereinafter referred to as Co-
Prosecutors, who shall work together to prepare indictments against the Suspects 
in the Extraordinary Chambers.
Article 17 new
The Co-Prosecutors in the Trial Chamber shall have the right to appeal the 
verdict of the Extraordinary Chamber of the trial court.
Article 18 new
The Supreme Council of the Magistracy shall appoint Cambodian prosecutors 
and Cambodian reserve prosecutors as necessary from among the Cambodian 
professional judges.
The reserve prosecutors shall replace the appointed prosecutors in case of their
absence. These reserve prosecutors may continue to perform their regular duties 
in their respective courts.
One foreign prosecutor with the competence to appear in both Extraordinary
Chambers shall be appointed by the Supreme Council of the Magistracy upon
nomination by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall submit a list of at least two
candidates for foreign Co-Prosecutor to the Royal Government of Cambodia, 
from which the Supreme Council of the Magistracy shall appoint one prosecutor 
and one reserve prosecutor.
Article 19
The Co-Prosecutors shall be appointed from among those individuals who are
appointed in accordance with the existing procedures for selection of prosecutors 
who have high moral character and integrity and who are experienced in the 
conduct of investigations and prosecutions of criminal cases.
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The Co-Prosecutors shall be independent in the performance of their functions 
and shall not accept or seek instructions from any government or any other 
source.
Article 20 new
The Co-Prosecutors shall prosecute in accordance with existing procedures in 
force. If these existing procedures do not deal with a particular matter, or if there 
is uncertainty regarding their interpretation or application or if there is a 
question regarding their consistency with international standards, the Co-
Prosecutors may seek guidance in procedural rules established at the 
international level.
In the event of disagreement between the Co-Prosecutors the following shall 
apply:
The prosecution shall proceed unless the Co-Prosecutors or one of them requests
within thirty days that the difference shall be settled in accordance with the 
following provisions;
The Co-Prosecutors shall submit written statements of facts and the reasons for 
their different positions to the Director of the Office of Administration.  The 
difference shall be settled forthwith by a Pre-Trial Chamber of five judges, three
Cambodian judges appointed by the Supreme Council of the Magistracy, one of 
whom shall be President, and two foreign judges appointed by the Supreme 
Council of the Magistracy upon nomination by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations. The appointment of the above judges shall follow the provisions 
of Article 10 of this Law.
Upon receipt of the statements referred to in the third paragraph, the Director of 
the Office of Administration shall immediately convene the Pre-Trial Chamber 
and communicate the statements to its members.
A decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber, against which there is no appeal, requires 
the affirmative vote of at least four judges. The decision shall be communicated 
to the Director of the Office of Administration, who shall publish it and 
communicate it to the Co-Prosecutors. They shall immediately proceed in 
accordance with the decision of the Chamber. If there is no majority as required 
for a decision, the prosecution shall proceed.
In carrying out the prosecution, the Co-Prosecutors may seek the assistance of 
the Royal Government of Cambodia if such assistance would be useful to the 
prosecution, and such assistance shall be provided.
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Article 21 new
The Co-Prosecutors under this law shall enjoy equal status and conditions of 
service according to each level of the Extraordinary Chambers.
Each Co-Prosecutor shall be appointed for the period of these proceedings.
In the event of the absence of the foreign Co-Prosecutor, he or she shall be 
replaced by the reserve foreign Co-Prosecutor.
Article 22 new
Each Co-Prosecutor shall have the right to choose one or more deputy 
prosecutors to assist him or her with prosecution before the chambers. Deputy 
foreign prosecutors shall be appointed by the foreign Co-Prosecutor from a list 
provided by the Secretary-General.
The Co-prosecutors shall be assisted by Cambodian and international staff as 
needed in their offices. In choosing staff to serve as assistants, the Director of the 
Office of Administration shall interview, if necessary, and with the approval of 
the Cambodian Co-Prosecutor, hire staff who shall be appointed by the Royal 
Government of Cambodia. The Deputy Director of the Office of Administration 
shall be responsible for the recruitment and administration of all foreign staff. 
The number of assistants shall be chosen in proportion to the Cambodian 
prosecutors and foreign prosecutors.
Cambodian staff shall be selected from Cambodian civil servants and, if 
necessary, other qualified nationals of Cambodia.
CHAPTER VII
INVESTIGATIONS
Article 23 new
All investigations shall be the joint responsibility of two investigating judges, one
Cambodian and another foreign, hereinafter referred to as Co-Investigating 
Judges, and shall follow existing procedures in force. If these existing procedures 
do not deal with a particular matter, or if there is uncertainty regarding their 
interpretation or application or if there is a question regarding their consistency 
with international standards, the Co-Investigating Judges may seek guidance in 
procedural rules established at the international level.
In the event of disagreement between the Co-Investigating Judges the following 
shall apply:
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The investigation shall proceed unless the Co-Investigating Judges or one of 
them requests within thirty days that the difference shall be settled in accordance 
with the following provisions.
The Co-Investigating Judges shall submit written statements of facts and the 
reasons for their different positions to the Director of the Office of 
Administration.
The difference shall be settled forthwith by the Pre-Trial Chamber referred to in
Article 20.
Upon receipt of the statements referred to in the third paragraph, the Director of 
the Office of Administration shall immediately convene the Pre-Trial Chamber 
and communicate the statements to its members.
A decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber, against which there is no appeal, requires 
the affirmative vote of at least four judges. The decision shall be communicated 
to the Director of the Office of Administration, who shall publish it and 
communicate it to the Co-Investigating Judges. They shall immediately proceed 
in accordance with the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber. If there is no majority 
as required for a decision, the investigation shall proceed.
The Co-Investigating Judges shall conduct investigations on the basis of 
information obtained from any institution, including the Government, United 
Nations organs, or non-governmental organizations.
The Co-Investigating Judges shall have the power to question suspects and 
victims, to hear witnesses, and to collect evidence, in accordance with existing 
procedures in force. In the event the Co-Investigating Judges consider it 
necessary to do so, they may issue an order requesting the Co-Prosecutors also to 
interrogate the witnesses.
In carrying out the investigations, the Co-Investigating Judges may seek the 
assistance of the Royal Government of Cambodia, if such assistance would be 
useful to the investigation, and such assistance shall be provided.
Article 24 new
During the investigation, Suspects shall be unconditionally entitled to assistance 
of counsel of their own choosing, and to have legal assistance assigned to them 
free of charge if they cannot afford it, as well as the right to interpretation, as 
necessary, into and from a language they speak and understand.
Article 25
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The Co-Investigating Judges shall be appointed from among the currently 
practising judges or are additionally appointed in accordance with the existing 
procedures for appointment of judges; all of whom shall have high moral 
character, a spirit of impartiality and integrity, and experience. They shall be 
independent in the performance of their functions and shall not accept or seek 
instructions from any government or any other source.
Article 26
The Cambodian Co-Investigating Judge and the reserve Investigating Judges 
shall be appointed by the Supreme Council of the Magistracy from among the 
Cambodian professional judges.
The reserve Investigating Judges shall replace the appointed Investigating Judges 
in case of their absence. The reserve Investigating Judges may continue to 
perform their regular duties in their respective courts.
The Supreme Council of the Magistracy shall appoint the foreign Co-
Investigating Judge for the period of the investigation, upon nomination by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall submit a list of at least two
candidates for foreign Co-Investigating Judge to the Royal Government of 
Cambodia, from which the Supreme Council of the Magistracy shall appoint one 
Investigating Judge and one reserve Investigating Judge.
Article 27 new
All Investigating Judges under this law shall enjoy equal status and conditions of
service.
Each Investigating Judge shall be appointed for the period of the investigation.
In the event of the absence of the foreign Co-Investigating Judge, he or she shall 
be replaced by the reserve foreign Co-Investigating Judge.
Article 28
The Co-Investigating Judges shall be assisted by Cambodian and international 
staff as needed in their offices.
In choosing staff to serve as assistants, the Co-Investigating Judges shall comply 
with the spirit of the provisions set forth in Article 13 of this law.
CHAPTER VIII
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
Article 29
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Any Suspect who planned, instigated, ordered, aided and abetted, or committed 
the crimes referred to in article 3 new, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this law shall be 
individually responsible for the crime.
The position or rank of any Suspect shall not relieve such person of criminal
responsibility or mitigate punishment.
The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 3 new, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this 
law were committed by a subordinate does not relieve the superior of personal 
criminal responsibility if the superior had effective command and control or 
authority and control over the subordinate, and the superior knew or had reason 
to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and 
the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent 
such acts or to punish the perpetrators.
The fact that a Suspect acted pursuant to an order of the Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea or of a superior shall not relieve the Suspect of 
individual criminal responsibility.
CHAPTER IX
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION
Article 30
The staff of the judges, the investigating judges and prosecutors of the 
Extraordinary Chambers shall be supervised by an Office of Administration.
This Office shall have a Cambodian Director, a foreign Deputy Director and such 
other staff as necessary.
Article 31 new
The Director of the Office of Administration shall be appointed by the Royal
Government of Cambodia for a two-year term and shall be eligible for 
reappointment.
The Director of the Office of Administration shall be responsible for the overall
management of the Office of Administration, except in matters that are subject to
United Nations rules and procedures.
The Director of the Office of Administration shall be appointed from among 
those with significant experience in court administration and fluency in one of 
the foreign languages used in the Extraordinary Chambers, and shall be a person 
of high moral character and integrity.
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The foreign Deputy Director shall be appointed by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations and assigned by the Royal Government of Cambodia, and shall 
be responsible for the recruitment and administration of all international staff, as 
required by the foreign components of the Extraordinary Chambers, the Co-
Investigating Judges, the Co-Prosecutors’ Office, and the Office of 
Administration. The Deputy Director shall administer the resources provided 
through the United Nations Trust Fund.
The Office of Administration shall be assisted by Cambodian and international 
staff as necessary. All Cambodian staff of the Office of Administration shall be 
appointed by the Royal Government of Cambodia at the request of the Director. 
Foreign staff shall be appointed by the Deputy Director.
Cambodian staff shall be selected from Cambodian civil servants and, if 
necessary, other qualified nationals of Cambodia.
Article 32
All staff assigned to the judges, Co-Investigating Judges, Co-Prosecutors, and 
Office of Administration shall enjoy the same working conditions according to 
each level of the Extraordinary Chambers.
CHAPTER X
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS
Article 33 new
The Extraordinary Chambers of the trial court shall ensure that trials are fair and
expeditious and are conducted in accordance with existing procedures in force, 
with full respect for the rights of the accused and for the protection of victims 
and witnesses. If these existing procedure do not deal with a particular matter, or 
if there is uncertainty regarding their interpretation or application or if there is a 
question regarding their consistency with international standard, guidance may 
be sought in procedural rules established at the international level.
The Extraordinary Chambers of the trial court shall exercise their jurisdiction in
accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and due process of 
law, as set out in Articles 14 and 15 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.
Suspects who have been indicted and arrested shall be brought to the Trial 
Chamber according to existing procedures in force. The Royal Government of 
Cambodia shall guarantee the security of the Suspects who appear before the 
court, and is responsible for taking measures for the arrest of the Suspects 
prosecuted under this law. Justice police shall be assisted by other law 
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enforcement elements of the Royal Government of Cambodia, including the 
armed forces, in order to ensure that accused persons are brought into custody 
immediately.
Conditions for the arrest and the custody of the accused shall conform to existing 
law in force.
The Court shall provide for the protection of victims and witnesses. Such 
protection measures shall include, but not be limited to, the conduct of in camera 
proceedings and the protection of the victim’s identity.
Article 34 new
Trials shall be public and open to representatives of foreign States, of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the media and of national and 
international non-government organizations unless in exceptional circumstances 
the Extraordinary Chambers decide to close the proceedings for good cause in 
accordance with existing procedures in force where publicity would prejudice 
the interests of justice.
Article 35 new
The accused shall be presumed innocent as long as the court has not given its
definitive judgment.
In determining charges against the accused, the accused shall be equally entitled 
to the following minimum guarantees, in accordance with Article 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
a. to be informed promptly and in detail in a language that they understand of 
the nature and cause of the charge against them;
b. to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defense and to
communicate with counsel of their own choosing;
c. to be tried without delay;
d. to be tried in their own presence and to defend themselves in person or with
the assistance of counsel of their own choosing, to be informed of this right and
to have legal assistance assigned to them free of charge if they do not have
sufficient means to pay for it ;
e. to examine evidence against them and obtain the presentation and 
examination
of evidence on their behalf under the same conditions as evidence against them;
f. to have the free assistance of an interpreter if the accused cannot understand or
does not speak the language used in the court;
g. not to be compelled to testify against themselves or to confess guilt.
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Article 36 new
The Extraordinary Chamber of the Supreme Court shall decide appeals made by 
the accused, the victims, or the Co-Prosecutors against the decision of the 
Extraordinary Chamber of the trial court. In this case, the Supreme Court 
Chamber shall make final decisions on both issues of law and fact, and shall not 
return the case to the Extraordinary Chamber of the trial court.
Article 37 new
The provision of Article 33, 34 and 35 shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of
proceedings before the Extraordinary Chambers of the Supreme Court.
CHAPTER XI
PENALTIES
Article 38
All penalties shall be limited to imprisonment.
Article 39
Those who have committed any crime as provided in Articles 3 new, 4, 5, 6, 7 
and 8 shall be sentenced to a prison term from five years to life imprisonment.
In addition to imprisonment, the Extraordinary Chamber of the trial court may 
order the confiscation of personal property, money, and real property acquired 
unlawfully or by criminal conduct.
The confiscated property shall be returned to the State.
CHAPTER XII
AMNESTY AND PARDONS
Article 40 new
The Royal Government of Cambodia shall not request an amnesty or pardon for 
any persons who may be investigated for or convicted of crimes referred to in 
Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this law. The scope of any amnesty or pardon that 
may have been granted prior to the enactment of this Law is a matter to be 
decided by the Extraordinary Chambers.
CHAPTER XIII
STATUS, RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
Article 41
The foreign judges, the foreign Co-Investigating Judge, the foreign Co-Prosecutor 
and the Deputy Director of the Office of Administration, together with their 
families forming part of their household, shall enjoy all of the privileges and 
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immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic agents in 
accordance with the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 
Such officials shall enjoy exemption from taxation in Cambodia on their salaries, 
emoluments and allowances.
Article 42 new
1. Cambodian judges, the Co-Investigating Judge, the Co-Prosecutor, the Director 
of the Office of Administration and personnel shall be accorded immunity from 
legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by 
them in their official capacity. Such immunity shall continue to be accorded after 
termination of employment with the Extraordinary Chambers, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and the Office of Administration.
2. International personnel shall be accorded in addition:
a. immunity from legal process in respect of words spoken or written
and all acts performed by them in their official capacity. Such
immunity shall continue to be accorded after termination of
employment with the co-investigating judges, the co-prosecutors, the
Extraordinary Chambers, the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Office of
Administration;
b. immunity from taxation on salaries, allowances and emoluments paid
to them by the United Nations;
c. immunity from immigration restriction;
d. the right to import free of duties and taxes, except for payment for
services, their furniture and effects at the time of first taking up their
official duties in Cambodia.
3. The counsel of a suspect or an accused who has been admitted as such by the
Extraordinary Chambers shall not be subjected by the Government to any 
measure that may affect the free and independent exercise of his or her functions 
under the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers.
In particular, the counsel shall be accorded:
a. immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of personal
baggage relating to his or her functions in the proceedings;
b. inviolability of all documents relating to the exercise of his or her functions
as a counsel of a suspect or accused;
c. immunity from criminal or civil jurisdiction in respect of words spoken or
written and acts performed in his or her capacity as counsel. Such immunity
shall continue to be accorded after termination of their function as counsel
of a suspect or accused.
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4. The archives of the co-investigating judges, the co-prosecutors, the 
Extraordinary Chambers, the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Office of 
Administration and in general all documents and materials made available to, 
belonging to, or used by them, wherever located in the Kingdom of Cambodia 
and by whomsoever held, shall be inviolable for the duration of the proceedings.
CHAPTER XIV
LOCATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS
Article 43 new
The Extraordinary Chambers established in the trial court and the Supreme 
Court Chamber shall be located in Phnom Penh.
CHAPTER XV
EXPENSES
Article 44 new
The expenses and salaries of the Extraordinary Chambers shall be as follows:
1. The expenses and salaries of the Cambodian administrative officials and
staff, the Cambodian judges and reserve judges, investigating judges and
reserve investigating judges, and prosecutors and reserve prosecutors shall
be borne by the Cambodian national budget;
2. The expenses of the foreign administrative officials and staff, the foreign
judges, Co-investigating judge and Co-prosecutor sent by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations shall be borne by the United Nations;
3. The defense counsel may receive fees for mounting the defense;
4. The Extraordinary Chambers may receive additional assistance for their
expenses from other voluntary funds contributed by foreign governments,
international institutions, non-governmental organizations, and other
persons wishing to assist the proceedings.
CHAPTER XVI
WORKING LANGUAGES
Article 45 new
The official working languages of the Extraordinary Chambers shall be Khmer,
English and French.
CHAPTER XVII
ABSENCE OF FOREIGN JUDGES, INVESTIGATING JUDGES OR
PROSECUTORS
Article 46 new
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In order to ensure timely and smooth implementation of this law, in the event 
any foreign judges or foreign investigating judges or foreign prosecutors fail or 
refuse to participate in the Extraordinary Chambers, the Supreme Council of the 
Magistracy shall appoint other judges or investigating judges or prosecutors to 
fill any vacancies from the lists of foreign candidates provided for in Article 11, 
Article 18, and Article 26. In the event those lists are exhausted, and the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations does not supplement the lists with new 
candidates, or in the event that the United Nations withdraws its support from 
the Extraordinary Chambers, any such vacancies shall be filled by the Supreme 
Council of the Magistracy from candidates recommended by the Governments of 
Member States of the United Nations or from among other foreign legal 
personalities.
If, following such procedures, there are still no foreign judges or foreign 
investigating judges or foreign prosecutors participating in the work of the 
Extraordinary Chambers and no foreign candidates have been identified to 
occupy the vacant positions, then the Supreme Council of the Magistracy may 
choose replacement Cambodian judges, investigating judges or prosecutors.
CHAPTER XVIII
EXISTENCE OF THE COURT
Article 47
The Extraordinary Chambers in the courts of Cambodia shall automatically 
dissolve following the definitive conclusion of these proceedings.
CHAPTER XIX
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND CAMBODIA
Article 47 bis new
Following its ratification in accordance with the relevant provisions of the law of
Kingdom of Cambodia regarding competence to conclude treaties, the 
Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia 
Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crime Committed during 
the period of Democratic Kampuchea, done at Phnom Penh on 6 June 2003, shall 
apply as law within the Kingdom of Cambodia.
FINAL PROVISION
Article 48
This law shall be proclaimed as urgent.
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Unofficial translation by the Council of Jurists and the Secretariat of the Task Force. 
Revised 29 Sept 2005.
